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In this Article, we submit that the compensation structures at
banks before the financial crisis were not necessarily flawed and
that recent reforms in this area largely reflect already existing best
practices. In Part I we review recent empirical studies on corporate
governance and executive pay at banks and suggest that there is no
strong support for regulating bankers' compensation structures. We
also argue that detailed regulation of incentives would subtract
essential decisionmaking powers from boards of directors and make
compensation structures too rigid.
In Part II we note that political support for regulating
bankers' pay has been strong and led to reforms promoting long-
term incentives to executives on the assumption that short-term
incentives were a cause of the crisis. The Financial Stability Board
Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (the "Principles')
follow this trend, at the same time representing a political
compromise between the various interest groups concerned. They
pick up traditional compensation criteria from pre-crisis best
practices, adapting them to the post-crisis setting, while leaving
some flexibility in pay structures. We suggest that a certain degree of
flexibility should be kept when implementing the Principles in
national jurisdictions.
In Part III we analyze the regulatory developments
concerning executive pay at banks in Europe and find variations in
the implementation of the Principles. We also show that
remuneration policies at large European banks are converging
toward the international Principles, while varying in the
implementation of individual standards. However, recent EU
reforms may change the situation considerably by imposing detailed
requirements as to pay structures in the financial sector. The
analysis in Parts I, II, and III speaks directly to this issue by
explaining why historic baselines will prove effective in certain
applications but decidedly problematic in others.
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INTRODUCTION
In the quest for possible causes of the recent financial crisis,
commentators often argued that bank executives had poor incentives.
Critics have claimed, in particular, that executive compensation was
not properly related to long-term performance, while regulators have
432 [Vol. 64:2:431
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sought ways to change practices to better align pay with long-term
performance.'
At least two questions arise with respect to incentive practices,
which we answer in Part I of this Article. The first is whether
executive compensation at banks before the crisis was predominantly
short-term oriented. Politicians argue, with the support of the media,
that widespread short-term incentives to bank managers were at the
root of the recent crisis. This claim led the Financial Services Forum
("FSF')-which later became the Financial Services Board ("FSB")-to
adopt two international schemes: the Principles for Sound
Compensation Practices ("the Principles") 2 and the Principles for
Sound Compensation Practices: Implementation Standards ("the
Standards"). 3 The main thrust of these principles concerns the long-
term orientation of incentives, which should assure an optimal
alignment of executives' motivations with prudent risk taking. The
European Union ("EU") and national reforms that we analyze in this
Article follow a similar path, emphasizing the need for long-term
orientation of pay and its importance for the control of risk taking by
banks.
However, recent empirical studies found no proof that
short-term incentives led to excessive risks. In the United States, pay
generally was aligned with the long-term interest of shareholders.
4
Indeed, CEOs of large U.S. financial institutions were heavily invested
in the equity of their firms at the onset of the crisis. Similar studies
are not yet available for Europe, because the data needed to calculate
1. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (Harvard Univ. Press 2009); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried,
Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1917 (2010); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital To Mitigate Systemic Risk (Columbia Law
& Econ. Working Paper Series, No. 380, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=1675015. For numerous media articles dedicated to the topic, see Alan S.
Blinder, Crazy Compensation and the Crisis, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2009 at A15; Deborah
Solomon & Damian Paletta, U.S. Eyes Bank Pay Overhaul: Administration in Early Talks on
Ways to Curb Compensation Across Finance, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2009, at Al, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124215896684
2 11987.html.
2. FIN. STABILITY FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES (2009)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications
Ir_0904b.pdf.
3. FIN. STABILITY BD., FSB PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES:
IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS (2009) [hereinafter STANDARDS], available at http://www.
fmancialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925c.pdf.
4. Ridiger Fahlenbrach & Ren6 M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, J.




the value of stock options and long-term incentives is either
insufficient or disclosed heterogeneously. 5 Our analysis finds that,
according to their disclosure before the crisis, most large European
banks adopted remuneration policies that were fairly balanced
between fixed and variable pay and included long-term incentives.
This was true both for ailing and non-ailing banks, making it unlikely
that, before the crisis, bank managers followed a short-term approach
induced by the structure of their incentives. Equity investments of
European CEOs in their own firms are not easily assessed, due to the
lack of consistent and detailed data on the value of stock options and
long-term incentives. However, the available data on managers'
holdings of shares in their firms indicate that CEOs' equity
investments at large European banks were lower than those of their
U.S. counterparts. 6 This is a remarkable difference between the
United States and Europe, consistent with the fact that executive
compensation at listed companies is generally lower in Europe.7 The
lack of large equity investments of CEOs in their firms makes the
empirical results of U.S. academic research less meaningful for
European practices.
8
The second question that we analyze in Part I is whether
banking regulation should cover compensation arrangements, either
by mandating pay structures or by requiring their adjustment in order
to avoid excessive risk taking. Several commentators have recently
addressed this policy issue in papers discussing how to limit excessive
risk taking by tying managers' pay to some measure of the value of
bank debts. 9 These commentators agree that regulators should either
require or at least recommend the relevant pay structures in order to
overcome the collective action problems of their adoption by banks. In
5. This is primarily due to the limits of mandated disclosure in this area. See Guido
Ferrarini et al., Understanding Directors' Pay in Europe: A Comparative and Empirical Analysis,
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 126, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers .cfm?abstractid=1418463.
6. See infra Part III.B (describing this difference in equity investments).
7. See Martin J. Conyon, Nuno Fernandes, Miguel A. Ferreira, Pedro Matos and Kevin
Murphy, The Executive Compensation Controversy: A Transatlantic Analysis, paper presented at
the Annual FRDB (Fondazione Rodolfo Benedetti) conference in Cagliari, May 29, 2009,
available at http://www.frdb.orgtupload/file/First.report.pdf; Randall S. Thomas, International
Executive Pay: Current Practices and Future Trends (Vanderbilt Law & Econ. Res. Paper, No.
08-26, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265122.
8. For a comprehensive analysis of the evolution in equity pay practices with focus on the
U.S. landscape, see David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of
Optimal Contracting (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-34, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1443170&rec=l&srcabs=1361149.
9. See infra Part I.B.2 (describing the views of these commentators in greater detail).
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this Article, we submit that regulators should not replace boards in
setting pay structures and that regulatory intervention concerning
executive compensation at banks should be limited in scope, so as to
maintain the flexibility of executive pay arrangements. We also argue
that regulating pay too strictly would only have limited and indirect
effects on bank soundness and stability, making it preferable for
supervisors to use the powers traditionally granted to them under
prudential regulation provisions. By exercising their traditional
powers, supervisors are able to monitor executive pay arrangements
and to assess incentives from a risk-taking perspective.
Answering these two questions allows us to critically examine
recent reforms in Part II. We first consider the European approach to
bankers' remuneration throughout the recent crisis, with particular
regard to the troubled banks that were rescued by their governments.
We then analyze the Principles and the Standards, issued in 2009 by
the FSB,10 and critically assess the same in light of our preceding
discussion. The FSB adopted the Principles following coordinated
action by the G20 governments, which rapidly responded to heavy
political pressure deriving, domestically and internationally, from the
financial crisis and repeated bank failures. Through swift adoption of
the Principles, authorities intended to show that reforms of the
international financial system were put in place in a timely manner
with respect to executive compensation,1" which the public and mass
media widely considered to be among the crisis' culprits.1 2 Moreover,
international coordination was needed to solve collective action
problems among states. Few governments would have been willing to
10. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2; STANDARDS, supra note 3.
11. See, e.g., Communiqu6, G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
(Apr. 23, 2010), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2319500120100423http
(describing actions taken in reaction to the financial crisis and its effects on global recovery); see
also Chris Giles & Krishna Guha, Leaders Seek to Retool Global Economy, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 25,
2009, at 8, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/199b024e-a96c-llde-9b7f-00144feabdcO.html#
axzzl94wijjsy (describing the framework and goals of the 2009 G20 meeting); James Wilson,
Germans to Speed up Pay Reform, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2009, at 4, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/85b986f6-e5f5- lde-b5d7-00144feab49a.html#axzz194xFPMcC
(outlining how several of the largest German banks agreed to speed up reform of rules governing
bonuses).
12. Public and media hostility at payments to leaders of failed institutions has been
widespread. See, e.g., In Depth: Bank Bonuses, FIN. TIMES, http://www.ft.com/indepthlbank-
bonuses (collecting articles); Outraged Americans Want AIG Bonus Money Recovered, GALLUP
(Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/116941/outraged.americans-aig-bonus-money-
recovered.aspx (discussing Gallup Poll results revealing that three in four Americans wanted the
government to take actions to block or recover the bonuses insurance giant AIG paid its
executives after receiving federal bailout funds).
2011] 435
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regulate executive pay in the absence of similar interventions by other
jurisdictions, for fear of competition from foreign financial institutions
in both the financial markets and the market for managers.
13
Despite being regarded as a fundamental piece of the post-
crisis financial reform, 14 the Principles are less innovative than is
often believed. To a large extent, they track compensation practices
that were already diffuse before the crisis. As shown by the empirical
studies analyzed in this Article, pre-crisis compensation practices of
large U.S. banks mainly were long-term oriented. Our analysis of
remuneration policies at large European banks in Part III shows that
a balanced mix of short-term and long-term incentives appeared to be
in place at most banks, including the ones that failed. The Principles
and Standards enhance the international pressure in this direction,
and some results already emerge from our analysis of post-crisis
remuneration structures at large European banks. 15 One novelty of
the Principles is their emphasis on the alignment of incentives with
prudent risk taking. This reflects the consideration given to the
interests of stakeholders, such as depositors and taxpayers, in
addition to those of shareholders. Compensation structures should
therefore not only maximize shareholder value, but also avoid
excessive risk taking.
On the whole, the Principles represent a political compromise
between the various interests at stake and the different views
concerning executive compensation's role in the financial crisis. Those
claiming that pre-crisis pay structures were too focused on short-term
gains and led to excessive risk taking by financial institutions should
be satisfied with the Principles' recognition of the need for long-term
orientation and alignment of incentives with prudent risk taking.
Financial institutions should not be disconcerted with the Principles'
ratification of what was known as sound compensation practice before
13. See Joel P. Trachtman, The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers,
Subsidiarity and Cooperation (June 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1630523 (providing an analytical template
for prudential financial regulation while recognizing that our ability to predict future crises is
limited and that any such institution must be flexible).
14. See, e.g., INST. OF INT'L FIN. (IF), COMPENSATION REFORM IN WHOLESALE BANKING
2010: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL STANDARDS, Introductory Statement (2010)
(considering FSB Principles "widely viewed as a set of global benchmarks for compensation
reform"); International Cooperation and Financial Regulatory Modernization: Testimony Before
the Subcomm. on Sec. and Int'l Trade and Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Daniel K. Tarullo, Gov. Fed. Reserve Bd.), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20lOO720a.htm#fl.
15. See infra Part III.
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the financial turmoil.16 They should also approve the Principles'
rejection of a "one size fits all" approach to executive compensation
issues, leaving room for differences in compensation structures based
on individual circumstances. Financial regulators undoubtedly are
among the winners in the political contest that produced the
Principles, which require incentives to be aligned with prudent risk
taking and extend the remit of prudential supervision to compensation
practices at financial institutions.
17
However, the success or failure of the Principles in practice will
largely depend on the ways in which they are implemented and
enforced at national levels. Domestic regulation could either enhance
or limit their flexibility. Supervisors might exert more or less pressure
on financial institutions to achieve compliance. Banks could
experiment with new structures, along the lines suggested by the
literature reviewed below, 18 provided that sufficient discretion is left
to their boards. We advocate throughout this Article for principles-
16. Even before the crisis, several best practice guidelines emphasized the importance of
aligning incentives with long-term performance through adopting long-term incentive plans in
equity form. See, e.g., DE NEDERLANDSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (Neth.), available at
http://www.commissiecorporategovernance.nllpageldownloads/CODE%
20DEFO/o20ENGELS%20COMPLEET%20III.pdf (English translation); BOURSE DE LUXEMBOURG
[LUXEMBOURG STOCK EXCHANGE], CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE 10 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE OF THE LUXEMBOURG STOCK EXCHANGE (2006), available at http://www.ecgi.org/
codes/documents/luxembourg-en.pdf (English translation); INT'L CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
NETWORK (ICGN), REMUNERATION GUIDELINES § 3.4.2 (2006), available at
http://www.icgn.org/files/icgn-main/pdfsIbest-practice/exec-remun/2006-executive-remuneration
.pdf ('The ICGN believes equity ownership guidelines and holding requirements should be an
integral component of company's equity plan and overall compensation philosophy."); ASS'N OF
BRITISH INSURERS (ABI), PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON REMUNERATION § 9.1 (2005), available
at www.abi.org.uk/Media/Releases/2005/12139942.doc ("Strong encouragement is given to use of
longer performance measurement periods of more than 3 years and deferred vesting schedules,
in order to motivate the achievement of sustained improvements in financial performance.");
TIAA-CREF, POLICY STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004), available at
http://www.tiaa-cref.orgucm/groups/content/@ap-ucm-p-tcp/documents/document/tiaaOlOO7871
.pdf (providing a best practices guide to corporate governance). For further explanations, see
infra Part II.B.2.
17. For various initiatives taken by the financial regulators, see CODE BANKEN (Neth.),
available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code-bankennetherlands_9sep2009_en.pdf
(English translation); Federation Bancaire Francaise [FBF] [French Banking Federation],
Normes professionnelles concernant la gouvernance et les r6mun~rations variables des
professionnels des marches financiers (2009); Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
[BaFin] [Federal Agency for Financial Market Supervision], Anforderung an die
Vergtungssysteme der Banken [Supervisory Requirements for Institutions' Remuneration
Systems], Circular 22/2009 (2009) (Ger.); Swiss Financial Markets Supervisory Authority
(FINMA), Remuneration Schemes, Minimum Standards for Remuneration Schemes of Financial
Institutions, Circular 2010/1 (2010).
18. Infra Part I.B.2.
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based regulation that is flexible enough to allow for innovation and
diversity in executive pay structures, while preventing excessive risk
taking. This is also in light of the recent economic literature on the
role of executive pay in the financial turmoil. 19 At the same time, we
emphasize the important role of the boards and the disclosure of
compensation practices, reiterating our claim for EU harmonization of
remuneration reports.
20
In Part III we analyze the implementation of the Principles
and Standards in Europe by examining the laws, corporate
governance codes, and regulatory guidelines of eight jurisdictions, in
addition to EU regulations. We also analyze the remuneration policies
of forty large European banks to check their conformity with
international standards. We find that convergence is on the rise,
particularly at the regulatory level; in addition, we assess current
trends and perspectives in light of the arguments developed
throughout the Article.
I. THEORIES AND POLICIES: IS REGULATION OF
BANKERS' PAY JUSTIFIED?
In this Part, we look for possible grounds for the regulation of
bankers' pay by analyzing the empirical and theoretical literature
recently developed in this area. We examine empirical works showing
that failures of corporate governance at European banks were not
necessarily at the root of the recent crisis and that weak pay
structures did not necessarily contribute to the crisis. We also analyze
theoretical works modeling optimal pay structures for bank executives
and claiming that these structures should be either mandated or
promoted by regulation. We conclude by suggesting a softer approach
to regulating bankers' pay, which would leave banks' boards relatively
free to decide on pay structures. A softer approach also would leave
regulators empowered to monitor both the boards' organization and
functioning and the relevant pay structures in order to assess their
impact on bank risks and activities.
19. See NOUR1EL ROUBiNi & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE IN THE
FUTURE OF FINANCE 184 (2010). See generally N.Y. UNIV. STERN SCH. OF BUS., RESTORING
FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM (Viral Acarya & Matthew Richardson
eds., 2009).
20. For an analysis of executive remuneration disclosure, see Guido Ferrarini et al.,
Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe, 10 J. CORP. L.
STuD. 73, 73-118 (2009).
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A. Bank Governance and the Financial Crisis
Executive remuneration is one of the key issues of today's
corporate governance. It is also critical for banks, as for all firms,
whose executives need incentives to maximize the wealth of their
shareholders. However, banks' corporate governance has unique
features relative to that of non-financial corporations. 21 In fact, bank
shareholders and managers have incentives to take more risks than is
economically and socially efficient, absent prudential regulation and
supervision. Moreover, due to the special nature of banks, they are
more prone to moral hazard than are non-bank managers and
shareholders. 22  After examining what determines this unique
framework, we review recent literature exploring whether failures of
corporate governance were among the determinants of the recent
crisis.
1. Why Bank Governance Is Special
Banks are different from other firms for several reasons that
matter from a corporate governance perspective. First, they are more
leveraged than other firms, with the consequence that the conflict
between shareholders and fixed claimants, which is present in all
corporations, is more acute for banks. 23 Second, banks' liabilities are
21. For scholarly analysis of some of these unique features, see Ren~e B. Adams & Hamid
Mehran, Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies?, 9 ECON. POL'Y REV.,
Apr. 2003, at 123, 123-42 (2003); Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Unique Features
in the Governance of Bankers' Compensation, in MET RECHT 123 (P. Essers, et. al. eds., Kluwer
2009); Kose John & Yiming Qian, Incentive Features in CEO Compensation in the Banking
Industry, 9 EcON. POL'y REV. Apr. 2003, 109, 109-21; Jonathan Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The
Corporate Governance of Banks, ECON. POL'Y REV. Apr. 2003, at 91, 91-107; Peter Mulbert,
Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis: Theory, Evidence, Reforms (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 130, 2009).
22. See E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, in THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS: 1982 ANNUAL REPORT (1982); available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/
ar1982a.cfm (analyzing whether banks are "special" or simply another provider of financial
services and how financial regulation should be shaped based on this determination); see also E.
Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special? A Revisitation, THE REGION (2000), available at
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications-papers/pub-display.cfm?id=3527 (revisiting his 1982
essay to determine how the financial sector has changed in the interim). See generally
Commission Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration
Policies, COM (2010) 285 final (June 2, 2010) (discussing the special corporate governance
regime of banks).
23. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 98 (explaining the role that corporate
governance plays in corporate performance and arguing that commercial banks pose unique
corporate governance problems for managers and regulators); William H. Meckling & Michael C.
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largely issued as demand deposits, while their assets, such as loans,
often have longer maturities. The mismatch between liquid liabilities
and illiquid assets may become a problem in a crisis situation, as we
vividly saw in the recent financial turmoil, when bank runs took place
at large institutions, threatening the stability of the whole financial
system.24 Third, despite contributing to the prevention of bank runs,
deposit insurance generates moral hazard by incentivizing
shareholders and managers of insured institutions to engage in
excessive risk taking. Moral hazard is exacerbated when a bank
approaches insolvency, because shareholders do not internalize the
losses from risky investments, but instead benefit from potential gains
(for example, by having an implicit put option at strike price zero).
25
While risk taking by non-bank corporations close to insolvency is
constrained by market forces and contractual undertakings, banks in
a similar condition can continue to attract liquidity, thanks to deposit
insurance.
26
Fourth, asset substitution is relatively easier in banks than in
non-financial firms.27 This allows for more flexible and rapid risk
shifting, which further increases agency costs between shareholders
and stakeholders (and bondholders and depositors in particular) and
also increases moral hazard of managers. In addition, banks are more
Jensen, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305, 305-60 (1976) (discussing the agency costs of debt).
24. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 97 (discussing bank runs as collective action
problems of depositors). Regarding the run on Northern Rock, see TREASURY COMMITT'EE, THE
RUN ON THE ROCK, 2007-8, H.C. 56-I (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk
/pa/cm2007O8/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/56i.pdf.
25. For a discussion of the possible remedy of "double liability," see Jonathan P. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: History and Implications, 27 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 31, 31-62 (1992). See also Andrea Polo, Corporate Governance of Banks: The
Current State of the Debate (MPRA Paper No. 2325, 2007), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/2325 (analyzing how the debate on the corporate governance of banks has a direct
bearing on the current discussions on the future of banking regulatory design).
26. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 98. For a lively account of public bailouts similar to
those seen in the recent crisis, see ANDREW R. SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF
How WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM-AND
THEMSELVES (2009). See also THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU:
REPORT 33 (2009) [hereinafter DE LAROSIIkRE REPORTI, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-
market/finances/docs/de-larosiere-report-en.pdf (describing moral hazards generated by public
bailouts).
27. See Ross Levine, The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of Concepts
and Evidence 1-19 (World Bank Pol'y Research Grp., Working Paper No. 3404, 2004), available
at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/defautWDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2004110/08/
000012009_20041008124126fRendered/PDF/WPS3404.pdf (discussing the special attributes of
banks).
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opaque-it is difficult to assess their risk profile and stability.28
Information asymmetries, particularly for depositors, hamper market
discipline and, in turn, increase moral hazard of managers.
For all these reasons, "good" corporate governance (that is,
aligning the interests of managers and shareholders) 29 may lead bank
managers to engage in more risky activities. 30 This is due to the fact
that a major part of the losses would be externalized to stakeholders,
while gains would be fully internalized by shareholders and managers
(if properly aligned by the right incentives). Prudential regulation and
supervision aim to reduce the excessive risk propensity of
shareholders and managers in order to guarantee the "safety and
soundness" of banks. An exogenous "regulatory" cost is allocated on
excessively risky behavior of bank managers, reducing agency costs
between shareholders and stakeholders.
2. Did "Bad Governance" Contribute to the Financial Crisis?
Recent empirical research confirms that good governance may
not be enough for bank soundness. A paper by Andrea Beltratti and
Rena Stulz investigates whether banks' poor performance in the
recent crisis was "the outcome of a financial Tsunami that hit them
unexpectedly" or the result of some banks being more inclined to
experience large losses. 31 The authors analyze possible determinants
(regulation, corporate governance, balance sheets, and profitability) of
bank performance measured by stock returns during the crisis for a
sample of ninety-eight large banks across the world, of which nineteen
are U.S. banks. Beltratti and Stulz find no evidence for the thesis
advanced in a report by the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development ("OECD") that the "financial crisis can be, to an
important extent, attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate
28. See id. at 7-9 (noting that there is greater opaqueness in banks than other industries).
29. For an appraisal of corporate governance criteria, see infra Part I.A.2.
30. See Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, Bank Governance, Regulation and Risk Taking, 93 J.
FIN. ECON. 259, 259-75 (2009) (showing that bank risk taking varies positively with the
comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank).
31. See Andrea Beltratti & Renb M. Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During the
Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation 2 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 254, 2009), available at http://ssrn
.comabstract id=1433502 (using the significant variation in stock returns of large banks across
the world between July 2007 and December 2008 to evaluate the importance of factors that have
been discussed as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis).
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governance arrangements."32 In particular, they find no evidence that
banks with better governance performed better during the crisis. 33 On
the contrary, banks with more pro-shareholder boards performed
worse.
According to Beltratti and Stulz, similar results are consistent
with "the view that banks that were pushed by their boards to
maximize shareholder wealth before the crisis took risks that were
understood to create shareholder wealth, but were costly ex post
because of outcomes that were not expected when the risks were
taken."34 In their opinion, bank balance sheets and bank profitability
in 2006 explain the performance of banks in the subsequent two years
better than governance and regulation.3 5 Indeed, banks with the
highest returns in 2006 had the worst returns during the crisis. In
addition, banks that had a higher Tier 1 capital ratio in 2006 and
more deposits in most cases performed better during the crisis.
36
Ren~e Adams reaches similar results in a paper assessing to
what extent the crisis can be attributed to bad governance of financial
firms.3 7 Her study aims to answer this question by comparing the
governance characteristics of financial firms that received bailout
money from the U.S. government under the Troubled Asset Relief
Program ("TARP") with those that did not. Her research indicates that
banks receiving TARP funds had more independent boards, larger
boards, more outside directorships for board members, and greater
incentive pay for CEOs than non-TARP banks. Except for the finding
of more independent boards, these results are consistent with the idea
that TARP banks had worse governance. However, Adams finds it
striking that TARP banks had boards that were more independent.
38
32. Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, FIN.
MARKET TRENDS (OECD, Paris, Fr. 2009) (manuscript at 52), available at http:/www.
oecd.orgtdataoecd32//42229620.pdf.
33. See Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 31, at 11 (measuring corporate governance using the
Corporate Governance Quotient ("CGQ score"), which is a relative measure of a firm's
investment in internal governance, i.e., its adoption of governance attributes that increase the
power of minority shareholders; the authors select forty-four attributes covering four broad
categories: board, audit, takeover and compensation).
34. Id. at 2 ('This evidence is most consistent with the Tsunami explanation for the crisis:
the attributes that the market valued in 2006, for instance a successful securitization line of
business, exposed banks to risks that led them to perform poorly when the crisis hit.").
35. Id. at 3-5.
36. Id. at 6, 14.
37. Renbe B. Adams, Governance and the Financial Crisis (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Fin. Working Paper No. 248, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1398583.
38. Id. at 13-14.
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One explanation could be that independent directors are less likely to
have in-depth knowledge of their banks and the financial expertise to
understand complex transactions like securitizations. In other words,
greater independence may be detrimental for a bank board because a
more independent board will not have sufficient expertise to monitor
the actions of the CEO.
39
The criteria for examining corporate governance employed by
the studies mentioned above are open to discussion. For instance,
independent directors are used as a proxy for good monitoring by the
board, but this monitoring depends on professional qualities and levels
of engagement in board activities that are not necessarily captured by
current definitions of independence. Similarly, international corporate
governance indexes make reference to aspects such as internal
controls, which do not necessarily reflect the detailed requirements for
proper monitoring of complex risk management processes by a bank
board.40 Thus, while establishing a prima facie case for excluding
corporate governance as a main determinant of the crisis, the above
studies cannot be used for asserting that what appeared to be good
governance at banks that failed was satisfactory in practice and in no
need of reform. A similar statement calls for proof that banks failed
despite the best monitoring efforts deployed by their boards, a proof no
doubt difficult to offer, particularly in light of the egregious risk
management failures seen in most troubled banks.
41
39. See id. at 15 (investigating the influence of corporate governance on financial firms'
performance during the 2007-2008 financial crisis and finding that firms with more independent
boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis).
For similar results, see David Erkens et al., Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial
Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Fin.
Working Paper No. 249, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
jd=1397685. The authors find that firms with more independent boards suffered from worse
stock returns and recognized larger write-downs during crisis.
40. See Sanjai Baghat et al., The Promise and Perils of Corporate Governance Indices, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1803-82 (2008) (detailing the limits of corporate governance indexes for
measuring corporate performance); Rene M. Stulz, Risk Management Failures: What Are They
and When Do They Happen?, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 2008, at 39, 39-48 (detailing the
complexities of risk management).
41. For a description of risk management failures, see, for example, SENIOR SUPERVISORS
GRP., OBSERVATIONS ON RISK MANAGEMENT DURING THE RECENT MARKET TURBULENCE (2008),
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking2008/SSGRiskMgt-doc.
final.pdf; Stulz, supra note 40.
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B. Empirical Studies and the Regulation of Bankers' Pay
Empirical research focusing on executive pay and its role in the
banking crisis offers results that are on the whole consistent with the
above studies. In this Subpart, we review this research and examine
the recent law and economics literature dealing with the optimal
structure of pay at banks. We conclude with some remarks on what we
believe is the right answer to the question of whether executive pay
calls for regulation. Principally managerial incentives should be taken
into account by supervisors; however, their design should be left to
bank boards.
1. Does Empirical Evidence Support a Claim for
Regulation of Bankers' Pay?
The above-cited paper by Rfidiger Fahlenbrach and Rend Stulz
analyzes a sample of ninety-eight U.S. banks and finds "no evidence
that banks with a better alignment of CEOs' interests with those of
their shareholders had higher returns during the crisis."42 Rather, the
authors identify "some evidence that banks led by CEOs whose
interests were better aligned with those of their shareholders had
worse stock returns and a worse return on equity."43 According to their
study, CEOs had substantial wealth invested in their banks, with the
median CEO portfolio including stocks and options in the relevant
bank worth more than eight times the value of the CEO's total
compensation in 2006.44 Similar equity holdings should have led CEOs
to focus on the long term, avoiding too much risk and excessive
leverage for their banks.45 Instead, the study shows that a bank's
stock return performance in 2007 and 2008 was negatively related to
the dollar value of its CEO's holdings of shares in 2006, and that a
42. Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 4, at 1.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 4 (specifying that changes in the bank's stock price could have easily wiped
out all of the CEO's annual compensation).
45. See id. at 2 (arguing that, if the market is efficient, stock prices will reflect changes in a
bank's long term performance). Therefore, CEOs with a large investment in their bank's equity
should find it advantageous to improve their banks' long-term performance, whenever it makes
sense to do so. If the market is inefficient, CEOs might be pushed into focusing on short-term
profit maximization for fear of losing their job if their banks did not grow as aggressively as the
market would require. However, in a similar case, the structure of incentive pay would not really
matter, for executives would pursue a short-term perspective despite their long-term equity
incentives. Id.
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bank's return on equity in 2008 was negatively related to its CEO's
holdings in shares in 2006.46
These data suggest that CEOs took exposures that they felt
were profitable for their shareholders ex ante but performed very
poorly ex post.47 Moreover, CEOs with better incentives to maximize
shareholder wealth took significantly greater risks than CEOs having
lower incentives. The fact that these risks translated into poor
outcomes is not evidence of CEOs acting against the interest of
shareholders, given that CEOs had large equity stakes in their own
institutions and did not try to reduce the same in anticipation of the
crisis.48 All of this is consistent with both the hypothesis that the crisis
was unexpected by top bank executives and the hypothesis that CEOs
focused knowingly and sub-optimally on the short term.
49
Short-termism is explored in a recent paper by Ing-Haw Cheng,
Harrison Hong, and Jose Scheinkman on the link between
compensation and risk taking during the 1992-2008 period.50 Their
empirical research establishes a persistent relationship between risk
taking and compensation. In particular, they show that "aggressive
firms who did well in the 1990s and were 'yesterday's heroes' were the
largest risk-takers and are today's outcasts in the crisis."51 The same
firms also tend to be high-compensation firms, suggesting that "risk
taking may be related to a firm-fixed effect such as firm culture that is
picked up by [the paper's] compensation measure."5 2 Moreover, the
paper explores the idea that risk taking and executive compensation
46. Id. at 4-5 (stating that an increase of one standard deviation in dollar ownership was
associated with lower returns of 9.6 percent and with a lower return on equity of 10.5 percent).
47. Id. at 5.
48. Id. at 25.
49. Id. at 6.
50. Ing-Haw Cheng et al., Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking 7
(NBER Working Paper No. 16176, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16176.pdf.
This Article tries to identify incentives other than those created by the traditional measure of
inside ownership, which does not have much explanatory power for financial institutions
performing worse in the crisis. Top executives, notwithstanding their high ownership stakes, face
"high-powered incentives related to market pressure from short-termist investors to out-perform
rivals," which can be described as "implicit incentives related to firing." Moreover, higher annual
payouts to top managers might reveal a firm culture for high-powered incentives, in the form of
either bonuses or "higher sensitivity of firing to short-term performance." The authors utilize a
"residual pay measure," defined as total executive compensation controlling for firm size, as a
proxy for explicit and implicit short-termist incentives.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 7, 8.
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may be related to heterogeneous shareholder preferences. 53 Far from
establishing causal links, the paper supports a story where short-
termist investors use short-term incentives to induce managers to
take large bets on risky positions.
54
Also focusing on the link between short-term incentives and
risk taking is the study by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Holger
Spamann on executive compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers in the 2000-2008 period.55 This study takes issue with
Fahlenbrach and Stulz, who argue that the huge losses suffered by
executives during the financial turmoil indicate that incentives cannot
be blamed for the credit crisis or for the dismal performance of banks.
The authors further argue that executives managed their firms in a
manner they believed would benefit shareholders. Bebchuk, Cohen,
and Spamann reject this argument with specific reference to the cases
of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, which commentators used to
show that disastrous risk-taking decisions were the result of top
executives' inability to perceive risks, not their compensation
structures.5
6
The authors argue that the large losses on shares that the top
financiers suffered when their firms melted down do not offer a full
picture of their payoffs, which should include both what the same
executives cashed out during these years and what they owned
initially. In the observed period, the relevant executives received large
amounts of cash bonus compensation and "regularly took large
amounts of money off the table by unloading shares and options."57 On
the whole, performance-based compensation provided top executives
at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers with cash flows of about $1.4
billion and $1 billion, respectively. These amounts substantially
exceed the value of the top executives' holdings at the beginning of the
period, which the authors estimate in the order of $800 million and
53. Id. at 25 (referencing short-termist investors-like mutual funds-"who want certain
firms to take more risks and hence give them short-term incentives to do so").
54. Id. at 27.
55. Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns
and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 257-82 (2010).
56. Id. at 259.
57. Id. at 269-70. The authors note that both Bear Stearns and Lehman limited how
quickly executives were able to unload equity awards, allowing this to take place only five years
after the making of the award. However, Lehman also granted stock options that became
exercisable usually within a year of the option grant. Moreover, the members of the top teams
were all long-serving executives who each year were able to unload the equity incentives
awarded to them five years earlier, which they usually did.
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$600 million, respectively.58 Even though the value of the remaining
shares was relatively modest for Bear Stearns' executives
($17 million) or nonexistent for Lehman's executives, their aggregate
cash benefits from performance-based compensation were "quite
sizable."
59
As to the implications of their findings, Bebchuk, Cohen, and
Spamann argue that the two cases analyzed in their paper provide a
basis for concern about the incentives of the two banks' executives.
Rather than producing a "tight alignment" of their interests with long-
term shareholder value, the design of performance-based
compensation provided executives of the relevant firms with
substantial opportunities "to take large amounts of compensation
based on short-term gains off the table and retain it even after the
drastic reversal of the two companies' fortunes."60 Indeed, executives
were incentivized "to seek improvements in short-term results even at
the cost of maintaining an excessively elevated risk of an implosion at
some point down the road."61 Other incentives, however, such as non-
monetary motivations or simply "excessive optimism" could have
affected their decisions. Nonetheless, the authors suggest that
regulators should carefully consider the design of performance-based
compensation in general and try to prevent the creation of perverse
incentives.
Overall, the three papers reviewed above do not offer clear
support for either regulating bankers' pay or suggesting that the same
should be more long-term oriented than it was in large banks before
the crisis. The Fahlenbrach and Stulz paper shows that the interests
of executives of troubled banks were substantially aligned with those
of shareholders through large equity stakes that executives held in
their firms. The Cheng paper identifies a correlation between risk
taking, high compensation, and the presence of short-termist
investors, suggesting that the latter may push financial firms'
executives with explicit and implicit incentives to excessive risk
taking. The Bebchuk paper focuses on short-term incentives,
highlighting their potential in inducing executives to take excessive
risks even in the presence of large equity investments in their firms.
None of these papers, however, establishes that before the crisis,
incentives in troubled banks were mainly short-term, or that
58. Id. at 261.
59. Id. at 270.




short-term incentives led banks' executives to undertake excessive
risks. All three papers acknowledge that bank executives might have
been motivated to take excessive risk by non-monetary incentives.
Only the Bebchuk paper recommends looking at short-term incentives
and their impact on risk taking by banks more seriously, from a
reform perspective. This approach is more in line with the
international trends, which will be analyzed in Part II.
2. Recent Proposals on the Optimal Structure of
Executive Pay at Banks
Calls for regulating bankers' pay have been advanced
post-crisis by financial economists and lawyers exploring, on
theoretical grounds, the incentives for excessive risk taking created by
remuneration structures and possible remedies from a regulatory
perspective. After reviewing these works, we offer our own perspective
on the possible goals and scope of regulation in this area.
A recent paper by Patrick Bolton, Hamid Mehran, and Joel
Shapiro models a similar claim for regulation, starting from the
proposition that the traditional theory of executive compensation does
not directly apply to levered firms. 62 In the presence of risky debt,
shareholders have an incentive to shift risk to creditors: "Not
surprisingly, structuring CEO incentives to maximize shareholder
value in a levered firm tends to encourage excess risk taking."
63
Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro suggest, therefore, that the CEO's
compensation at similar firms, including financial institutions, "ought
to be structured to maximize the whole value of the firm-equity and
debt value-and not just the value of equity."
6 4
They propose, in particular, to tie CEO compensation, at least
in part, to a measure of default riskiness of the firm, such as a bank's
credit default swap ("CDS") spread over the performance evaluation
period. An increase in the CDS spread would result in lower
compensation, thus limiting risk shifting by the managers.65 Bolton,
62. PATRICK BOLTON ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.C STAFF REPORT No. 456,
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND RISK TAKING (2010), available at http://www.ny.frb.
orglresearch/staff reports/sr456.pdf.
63. Id. at 1.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1-2. The authors provide empirical evidence for their proposal by focusing on the
disclosure of deferred compensation in proxy statements filed with the SEC. Their results
suggest that disclosure of deferred compensation is priced in credit markets through a reduction
in the CDS spreads at proxy announcements.
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Mehran, and Shapiro also recognize that it is not obvious that bank's
shareholders will make use of similar incentive contracts to reduce
risk taking by executives. Indeed, the lower riskiness of the bank
should translate into a lower cost of debt and induce shareholders to
tie compensation to CDS spreads. However, deposit insurance and
investors' misperception of risk would work against a similar
compensation structure by reducing shareholders' incentives to limit
risk taking by the bank.66 In the authors' opinion, therefore,
regulation should mandate the recommended structure, at least for
large financial institutions.
67
Bebchuk and Spamann advance a similar proposal by
recommending regulation of executive pay at banks and designing a
pay structure intended to avoid excessive risk taking.68 In their
opinion, "regulation of executive pay would be warranted even if
banks had no governance problems." This is for the same reason that
traditionally underlies bank regulation: shareholders do not
internalize losses that risk taking could impose on bondholders,
depositors, and taxpayers. Moreover, mandating pay structures could
supplement the traditional regulation of banking activities: "Indeed, if
pay arrangements are designed to discourage excessive risk taking,
direct regulation of activities could be less tight than it should
otherwise be."69 Bebchuk and Spamann propose, in particular, that
executive pay should be tied to the aggregate value of a basket of
securities (including common shares, preferred shares and bonds)
issued by either a bank holding company or a bank, rather than to the
value of common shares only.70 Both the proposal by Bolton, Mehran,
and Shapiro and the one advanced by Bebchuk and Spamann tie
executives' incentives to the enterprise value of a bank rather than to
shareholder value, inducing bank executives to take the interests of
depositors and other creditors into account. However, the two
proposals differ to the extent that the former makes reference to CDS
for measuring the value of debt, while the latter mainly considers the
66. Id. at 14-21.
67. Id. at 28 (noting that, at a minimum, bank regulators should recommend compensation
committees to study ways in which compensation could be tied to the bank's CDS spread).
68. Lucian Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 247-87
(2010).
69. Id. at 254 (stating that, at a minimum, bank supervisors should closely monitor
compensation structures and take the same into account when assessing the risks posed by a
bank and exercising their supervisory powers).
70. Id. at 253.
2011] 449
VANDERBIL T LAW REVIEW
value of a basket of securities issued by the same bank (or bank
holding company) .71
Other scholars recommend a mandatory structure for executive
pay at banks, similarly designed to control risk taking but making
reference to instruments different from those considered so far.
Frederick Tung suggests that subordinated debt should be included as
part of managers' pay arrangements to align their interests more
closely with those of more risk-averse debt holders and ultimately
with those of regulators in assuring banks' safety and soundness.
72
Jeffrey Gordon refers to subordinated debt from a different
perspective, suggesting that senior executives should receive a
significant portion of stock-related compensation in the form of
"convertible equity-based pay," that is, "equity that will convert into
subordinated debt upon certain external triggering events, such as a
downgrade by the regulators to a 'high risk category' or a stock price
drop of a specified percentage over a limited time period."
73
Both Gordon and Tung criticize Bebchuk and Spamann's
proposal from various angles, focusing on its technical details, 74 yet
sharing the core idea that executives' incentives at banks should take
the interests of creditors into account, so as to avoid excessive risk
taking. All papers considered in this Subpart also agree that the
adoption of similar pay structures would be fraught, in practice, with
serious collective action problems and suggest regulatory intervention.
The nature of this intervention is still unclear, with references being
made either to regulators' promoting or mandating similar
71. Bebchuk and Spamann also make a quick reference to the possibility of using CDS for
measuring the value of debt. Id. at 285 n.98 ('While shareholders of firms outside the banking
sector (or directors elected by such shareholders) should not be constrained by regulators in
setting the structure of executive pay arrangements, firms seeking to reduce their borrowing
costs should be free, of course, to agree to covenants that require them to tie executive pay to the
value of the firm's debt securities.").
72. Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for
Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Summer 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn
.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid- 1546229.
73. Jeffrey Gordon, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in Financial Firms:
The Case for Convertible Equity.Based Pay 2 (Columbia Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 373,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1633906.
74. See Tung, supra note 72, at 29 (noting that as bank managers' individual situations will
vary in ways that are not correlated with their bank holding companies' capital structures, there
is no conceptual basis for assuming that executive pay in the form of a representative slice of the
bank holding companies' securities will offer appropriate incentives to internalize risk at the
banking subsidiary); Gordon, supra note 73, at 9 (criticizing the proposal for placing a burden on
regulators to define the elements of the firm's capital structure that would be included in the
compensation formula, while arguing that enterprise value is not trivial to measure and is not
necessarily an effective instrument to change managerial conduct).
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structures,75 or to regulators' encouraging "appropriate amounts of
subordinated debt in bankers' pay arrangements, while at the same
time preserving the discretion of boards of directors to set pay."
76
3. On the Optimal Approach to Regulating Bankers' Pay
We argue in this Article that the case for regulating bankers'
pay is weak, especially since it is far from proven that pay structures
widely contributed to excessive risk taking before the recent crisis.
According to some of the studies reviewed above, corporate governance
and compensation structures at banks that failed were not necessarily
flawed. Even assuming that compensation structures were flawed, the
need for regulation would not automatically be established. On the
contrary, we believe that mandating pay structures would hamper the
flexibility of compensation arrangements, which need to be tailored to
individual firms-according to their circumstances-and to individual
managers in light of their personal portfolios of their banks'
securities.
77
In theory, regulators could devise different pay structures for
different firms and situations, offering a menu of choices to supervised
entities. However, this menu could hardly cover all situations that
may exist in practice, while a broad set of choices would practically
dilute the impact of regulation, an outcome that we would favor in
principle. In addition, regulators may not be professionally qualified
for designing pay structures and monitoring their implementation in
practice. Moreover, banks' boards would partially lose one of their key
governance functions-setting executive pay-finding it more difficult
to align executives' incentives to corporate strategy and risk profile.
This would also create problems in keeping and attracting managerial
talent, particularly from countries that have adopted a more liberal
stance or from firms that are not subject to such regulatory
constraints (such as hedge funds or private equity groups).
No doubt, regulators should take managerial incentives into
account when setting the standards for banking activities and
organization and when supervising their implementation in practice
from the perspective of bank safety and soundness. However, this
should be done in ways that are appropriate for prudential regulation,
which typically establishes conditions and limits to risk taking, rather
75. BOLTON ET AL., supra note 62, at 28; Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 68, at 37.
76. Tung, supra note 72, at 49.
77. Id. at 48.
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than by fixing the incentive structures directly. Indeed, prudential
regulation establishes the conditions for the performance of banking
activities, such as capital adequacy requirements and limits to risk
concentration, without mandating the structure and contents of the
individual transactions. 78 Bankers' remuneration should be treated no
differently. Rather than designing compensation structures, which is a
matter for boards, regulators should analyze the impact of existing
structures on risk taking and should conduct their supervisory action
accordingly, for example, by imposing higher capital requirements to
institutions adopting "aggressive" remuneration mechanisms. 79
In addition, regulators could (and to a certain extent have done
already) ° establish requirements for the corporate governance of
banks, including compensation governance, and for the disclosure of
remuneration policies to investors and supervisors.81 Rather than
interfere with pay structures, this type of regulation aims to ensure
that organizational structures and procedures are in place for the
setting of pay in compliance with safety and soundness requirements.
More generally, regulators should acknowledge that even good
corporate governance may not be enough to avoid excessive risk taking
78. Regulation of structure and/or contents of transactions may be introduced for reasons
other than prudential concerns, such as consumer protection. On the concept and scope of
prudential regulation, see the introductory chapter in PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF BANKS AND
SECURITIES FIRMS: EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 3-25 (Guido Ferrarini ed., 1995).
79. The four key principles of supervisory review in the Second Pillar of Basel II reflect this.
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION [BCBS], INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2006), available at
http://www.bis.org/publfbcbs128.htm. In particular, Principle 3 (stating that supervisors should
have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum) and Principle 4
(providing that supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from
falling below the minimum levels required to support the risk characteristics of a particular
bank) promote such increased requirements. Id. at 757-60. Basel II also concluded that:
Supervisors should consider a range of options if they become concerned that a bank is
not meeting the requirements embodied in the supervisory principles outlined above.
These actions may include intensifying the monitoring of the bank, restricting the
payment of dividends, requiring the bank to prepare and implement a satisfactory
capital adequacy restoration plan, and requiring the bank to raise additional capital
immediately. Supervisors should have the discretion to use the tools best suited to the
circumstances of the bank and its operating environment.
Id. at 759.
80. BCBS, PRINCIPLES FOR ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2010), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl76.htm.
81. On the impact of remuneration disclosure on corporate governance, see Jeffrey Gordon,
'Say on Pay" Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46
HARv. J. ON. LEGIS. 323, 323-67 (2009).
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and therefore strengthen (as indeed they are doing)8 2 the traditional
tools of prudential supervision that have a direct impact on risk
taking by banks (such as capital requirements and risk measurement
criteria).
Given the political pressure to regulate executive pay
arrangements at banks, which is further illustrated in Part II, we
suggest that regulators-in addition to enforcing and strengthening
the prudential regulation requirements along the above lines-could
follow a soft approach to compensation standards by suggesting which
structures, in their view, would hamper excessive risk taking by
banks. From this perspective, the studies analyzed above offer useful
insights to bank boards and supervisors, showing the pros and cons of
different arrangements linking pay to the interests of depositors and
other stakeholders.8 3 It is also clear that similar recommendations
from supervisors would help solve the collective action problems
relative to the adoption of pay mechanisms that are not directly tied to
wealth maximization purposes, and actually could run against the
short-term expectations of shareholders.8 4 However, we believe that
the ultimate choice of pay structures should be left to the boards,
which have better knowledge both of the individual banks' businesses
and situations, and of their managers' portfolios of their respective
bank securities.
II. POLITICS AND REFORMS: THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL
PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
The financial crisis has put the banking industry's
compensation policies and incentive models under severe scrutiny
from investors, regulators, politicians, and the wider public on both
sides of the Atlantic. Two main problems have been discussed in the
political arena. One is the level of remuneration at large banks, which
appeared to be excessive in the United States and in Europe. The
other is the remuneration structure, which, according to widespread
82. BCBS, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK (2009), available at http://www.
bis.org/publ/bcbs/basel2enhO90l.htm.
83. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 68, at 253-54 (arguing that regulating bankers pay
could well supplement and reinforce the traditional regulation of banks' activities: "Indeed, if pay
arrangements are designed to discourage excessive risk taking, direct regulation of activities
could be less tight than it would otherwise be").
84. See Gordon, supra note 73, at 6 (highlighting a particular sort of collective action
problem in which the interest of the "large shareholder" (undiversified) minority can outweigh
the interests of the "small shareholder" (diversified) majority; the author specifies that large
shareholders could either be 'patient' shareholders or 'short-termist' hedge funds).
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opinion, may induce excessive risk taking and encourage short-
termism. Social resentment focused on the former. Lavish
compensation packages paid by banks, which governments
subsequently had to rescue, amplified the social debate, often
provoking a populist response by politicians. Regulatory concerns
concentrated on the latter, regarding remuneration design as a main
contributor to excessive risk taking by rewarding bankers for superior
performance, while simultaneously not penalizing failure.8 5
In this Part, we first analyze the impact of the recent crisis on
executive compensation at banks and the relevant regulations adopted
in Europe. We then consider the rise of international principles and
standards, which were influenced by the national measures adopted
during the crisis, when governments had to rescue banks and
restructure the same in order to assure the survival of the
international financial system. We conclude with some critical
remarks on these principles and standards in light of the economic
studies reviewed in Part I of this Article.
A. The European Approach to Bankers'Pay Through the Crisis
After the EU Heads of State Summit in Paris in October 2008,
central banks and governments implemented state aid measures
aimed at safeguarding financial stability and restoring the viability of
the EU banking sector.8 6 Member States intervened not only to rescue
distressed institutions from bankruptcy, but also to prevent further
collapses that would have seriously affected the whole banking system
85. See DE LAROSItRE REPORT, supra note 26 (launching regulatory reform in the financial
sector and providing a good overview on how financial institutions engaged in risky activities,
creating perverse incentives, which eventually caused systemic failure; also offering an
understanding of the measures that were taken afterwards by regulators to counteract risky
incentives, in the area of remuneration structure and incentives' risk management); see also
COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POL' GRP., CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISK: A ROAD TO REFORM (2008),
available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/docs/CRMPG-III.pdf (concluding that compensation
schemes in financial services were one of five primary driving forces of the financial crisis); Kevin
J. Murphy, Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk (Marshall Sch. of Bus., Working Paper
No. FBE 34-09, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1461944
(describing the ways in which compensation in the U.S. financial industry encouraged risk
taking).
86. These measures included economic stimulus packages, injections of central bank
liquidity, recapitalizations of financial institutions, guarantee schemes for certain types of
financial activity and in particular inter-bank lending, asset disposals and "bad bank" solutions,
and nationalization of distressed financial institutions, with a view toward restructuring and re-
entry into the market. Communications and reports on the activities of the EU for 2008 and 2009
are available at General Report on the Activities of the European Union, EUROPA.EU,
http://europa.eu/generalreportlen/2008/rg2.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
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and the real economy.8 7 Several governments acquired shareholdings
in financial institutions.88 The level of involvement, its timing, and its
exit strategies varied from country to country.8 9 All of these measures
were accompanied by the adoption of specific requirements concerning
executive compensation at ailing banks that we examine below.
1. European Union
Financial institutions recurring to government protection
benefited from a certain competitive advantage, which was
counterbalanced by several conditions regarding compliance with
several EU requirements: a restrictive policy on dividend payments,
an increased solvency ratio, and limits to executive remuneration,
87. For an overview of Member States' rescue measures, including individual cases, see
Press Release, European Comm'n, State Aid: Overview of National Measures Adopted as a
Response to the Financial/Economic Crisis (June 29, 2009), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/305; Ana Petrovic & Ralf
Tutsch, National Rescue Measures in Response to the Financial Crisis (European Cent. Bank,
Working Paper No. 8, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=14304; see also Didier Martin, Olivier Saba & Forrest G. Alonga, European Responses to the
Financial Crisis, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3
/papers.cfm?abstract id= 1337586.
88. State intervention typically takes the form of public ownership or financial support
through lending of last resort, taxpayers' money, or transfer of assets. State intervention falls,
however, under the state aid regime and has to be communicated and examined by the
Commission. See generally Elena Carletti & Xavier Vives, Regulation and Competition Policy in
the Banking Sector, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EU: FIFTY YEARS ON FROM THE TREATY OF
ROME 260 (Xavier Vives ed., 2007).
89. For instance, the U.K. government is a controlling shareholder in RBS and Lloyds, after
bailing them out, and fully owns Northern Rock after its nationalization in 2008. The German
state owns a significant stake in Commerzbank, whilst the French government has important
stakes in BNP Paribas and Soci6t6 Gbn6rale. As of July 2009, the U.K. government held a forty-
three percent stake in Lloyds and a 70 percent stake in RBS. See U.K. FIN. INVS. LTD. (UKF),
UKFI STRATEGY: MARKET INVESTMENTS AND ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2008/09, at 2,
available at http://www.ukfi.co.uk/releases/UKFI%20Annual%/20Report%/202008-2009.pdf. The
French government owned seventeen percent of BNP Paribas and 7.2 percent of Soci6t6
G6n6rale. See, e.g., BNP Paribas Launches C4.3bn Rights Issue, Dow JONES NEWSWIRE, Sept. 29,
2009, http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2009-09-29Ibnp-paribas-launches-rights-issue;
Scheherazade Daneshkhu, French State is BNP's Bigger Investor, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at 16,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/587b82a6-23b9-1 lde-996a-OO144feabdcO.html#
axzzlAiQGH4xo; French State Holds 17% of BNP Paribas: Regulator, FIN. EXPRESS, Apr. 7,
2009, available at http://www.financialexpress.com/news/french-state-holds-17-of-bnp-paribas-
regulator/444264/. The German government had a twenty-five percent stake in Commerzbank.
See COMMERZBANK, ANNUAL REPORT 2009, available at http://annualreport2009.commerzbank.
com/reports/commerzbank/annual2009/gb/Englishl/Ohome.html. The Swiss government had nine
percent of UBS and was the first European government to exit. See BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS (BIS), PAPERS No. 48, AN ASSESSMENT OF FINANCIAL SECTOR RESCUE
PROGRAMMES 27 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publbppdfibispap48.htm.
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including bonuses.90 Conditions with respect to executive pay initially
targeted banks in which governments had a block-holding as a result
of recapitalization schemes. 91 Government rules were subsequently
extended to other financial institutions, often with the objective of
applying them across the financial industry. Proposals for increased
transparency, linking remuneration to performance and risk
management, and strengthening shareholder rights were discussed
globally.9
2
The European Commission initially issued standards on
executive remuneration through several Communications related to
national state aid. The Banking Communication, which set the
framework for rescue operations finalized to prevent bank runs,
prohibited management from retaining undue benefits, thereby
empowering governments, inter alia, to intervene in remuneration.
93
The Recapitalization Communication, which set standards and
safeguards for bank recapitalization to ensure adequate levels of
lending to the economy, provided for limitations on executive
remuneration and bonuses. 94 The Impaired Asset Communication,
which offered the framework for removing toxic assets and
90. For more details on the conditions, see Martin et al., supra note 87.
91. Martin et al., supra note 87, at 18-20.
92. See, e.g., TREASURY COMMITTEE, BANKING CRISIS: REFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND PAY IN THE CITY, 2008-9, H.C. 519, at 8-32 (evaluating remuneration in the U.K. banking
sector); Communication from the Commission Accompanying Commission Recommendation
Complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as Regards the Regime for
the Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies and Commission Recommendation on
Remuneration Policies in the Financial Services Sector, at 2-5, COM (2009) 211 final (Apr. 30,
2009) (evaluating and recommending remuneration policies to the EU financial sector);
Communication for the Spring European Council: Driving European Recovery, Volume I, at 4-6,
COM (2009) 114 final (Mar. 4, 2009) (identifying reforms to ensure that relevant actors are
subject to appropriate regulation and oversight); PARL. EUR. DOC. (SEC 580) 3-4 (2009)
(providing a detailed analysis of existing European remuneration policies and possible policy
changes); DE LAROSIPRE REPORT, supra note 26, at 29-31 (making recommendations for better
aligning compensation incentives with shareholder interests); Pittsburgh Summit, Leaders'
Statement (Sept. 24-25, 2009), available at http://www.pittsburghsummit
.gov/documents/organizationl129853.pdf (reviewing the progress of the financial recovery); Letter
from Gordon Brown, Angela Merkel, and Nicolas Sarkozy to the Members of the European
Council (Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2009
/09/03/BrownMerkelSarkozy.pdf (issuing a joint statement prior to the Pittsburg Summit).
93. Communication from the Commission (EU), The Application of State Aid Rules to
Measures Taken in Relation to Financial Institutions in the Context of the Current Global
Financial Crisis, 2008 O.J. (C 270) 8, 8-9.
94. Communication from the Commission (EU), The Recapitalization of Financial
Institutions in the Current Financial Crisis: Limitation of Aid to the Minimum Necessary and
Safeguards Against Undue Distortions of Competition, 2009 O.J. (C 10) 2, 8-9.
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underperforming loans, required caps on executive remuneration to be
considered by banks applying for asset relief measures.
95
2. Member States and Switzerland
EU Member States and Switzerland adopted different
measures with respect to ailing banks, the relevant criteria of which
often were followed by non-ailing banks.
96
a. United Kingdom
The FSA was the first regulator to publish an industry-wide
comprehensive Code on remuneration practices, which was initially
aimed at banks in receipt of public funds97 but subsequently was
extended across the U.K. banking sector. The FSA review document
issued in response to the crisis (the "Turner Review") highlighted
remuneration as a major concern and included proposals that
incentives be designed to avoid undue risk taking.98 Indeed, the FSA
95. Communication from the Commission (EU), The Treatment of Impaired Assets in the
Community Banking Sector, 2009 O.J. (C 72) 1, 6-7.
96. We refer to banks as "ailing" if they participated in any of the government rescue
schemes in their home state; otherwise, we consider them as "non-ailing." See Guido Ferrarini &
Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Executive Pay at Ailing Banks and Beyond. a European Perspective 5
CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 197, 197-217 (2010) (analyzing ailing vs. non-ailing banks' remuneration
policies).
97. In February 2009, the Financial Services Authority ("FSA") published its draft code on
remuneration. FSA, FSA DRAFT CODE ON REMUNERATION PRACTICES (Apr. 2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages[Library/Other-publications/Miscellaneous/2009/cop-remun.shtml.
The first revision of the Code was issued in March 2009. FSA, FSA DRAFT CODE ON
REMUNERATION PRACTICES (rev. Mar. 18, 2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uklpubs
/other/remuneration.pdf. The first consultation was issued a few days later. FSA CONSULTATION
PAPER No. 09/10, REFORMING REMUNERATION PRACTICES IN FINANCIAL SERVICES (Mar. 2009),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cpO9-lO.pdf._ This was followed by a statement in
August 2009, which reflected feedback from the consultation and an assessment of progress in
international alignment. FSA POLICY STATEMENT 09/15, REFORMING REMUNERATION PRACTICES
IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: FEEDBACK ON CP09/10 AND FINAL RULES (Aug. 2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uklpubs/policy/psO915.pdf. Through this statement, the FSA incorporated
the Code into its Handbook for a group of the largest banks, building societies and broker
dealers, taking effect on January 1, 2010. In its latest consultation paper, the FSA is broadening
the scope of its Remuneration Code, from twenty-seven banks to more than 2,500 financial
services companies, including the U.K. branches of many overseas businesses. FSA
CONSULTATION PAPER 10/19, REVISING THE REMUNERATION CODE 20 (2010), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cplO19.pdf.
98. FSA, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS
7-9 (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner-review.pdf. Following the
banking crisis, the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked Lord Turner, in his capacity as FSA
Chairman, to review and make recommendations for reforming U.K. and international
approaches to the way banks are regulated.
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had been widely criticized for failing to spot the excessive risk taking
that sparked the financial crisis. In this regard, the U.K. Treasury
issued a report arguing that bonus-driven remuneration structures
had encouraged reckless and excessive risk taking, contrary to the
interests of shareholders and the long-term sustainability of the
financial system.99 The report questioned whether the FSA had
attached sufficient priority to handling remuneration at financial
institutions and suggested enhanced disclosure of remuneration
structures and a greater role for remuneration committees.
Furthermore, Sir David Walker's recommendations on corporate
governance of banks and other financial entities attempted to increase
awareness as to the importance of disclosure and governance of pay
for U.K. banks. 10
Upon rescuing two of the United Kingdom's main banks,
Lloyds Bank ("Lloyds") and Royal Bank of Scotland ("RBS"), the U.K.
government imposed specific conditions on remuneration policy. 10 1
Participation in the recapitalization scheme imposed an obligation on
both banks to address the remuneration of senior executives. No cash
bonuses were paid to board members for 2008. In the following years,
incentives had to be reviewed and linked to long-term value creation,
taking into account risks and restricting the potential of rewards for
failure. 0 2 Participation in the Asset Protection Scheme carried
additional conditions, such as implementing a remuneration policy
consistent with the detailed principles set out in the FSA Code on
remuneration practices, including a restriction on bonuses.
0 3
Following Lloyds and RBS, some large non-ailing banks adopted
similar changes to their remuneration policies. In particular, Barclays,
99. TREASURY COMMITTEE, supra note 92, at 3. The Treasury defined the FSA's approach to
remuneration prior to the crisis as "very modest." Id. at 19.
100. DAVID WALKER, HER MAJESTY'S TREASURY, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 106-07 (2009), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.ud20100407010852/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/
walkerreview_261109.pdf.
101. TREASURY COMMITTEE, supra note 92, at 34-37; Petrovic & Tutsch, supra note 87, at
84-85. The United Kingdom also fully nationalized two other banks, Northern Rock and
Bradford & Bingley. However, limits to compensation were only set for Lloyds and RBS. See
Ferrarini & Ungureanu, supra note 96, at 210 et seq. (describing the case studies of Lloyds and
RBS).
102. Press Release, Her Majesty's Treasury, Statement on Financial Intervention to Support
Lending in the Economy (Jan. 19, 2009), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk
/press05_09.htm.
103. Press Release, Her Majesty's Treasury, Statement on the Government's Asset
Protection Scheme (Jan. 19, 2009), available at www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press-07-09.htm.
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HSBC, and Standard Chartered adjusted their remuneration levels by
reducing or waiving variable compensation.
10 4
b. Germany
The German bailout measures were included in the Financial
Market Stabilization Act of October 2008.105 This was complemented
by the Financial Market Stabilization Supplementary Act of April
2009, which paved the way for the nationalization of some German
banks.106 The Act established the Financial Markets Stabilization
Fund ("SoFFin") with a temporary purpose. 10 7 In agreement with
SoFFin, banks accepting stabilization aid were subject to restrictions
on their compensation and dividend policies for the duration of the
state aid, depending on the type and amount of aid received and their
economic situation. Accordingly, these banks had to reexamine their
compensation packages to ensure that overall compensation of board
members and managing directors was reasonable, to limit monetary
compensation to C500,000 per year, and to ban bonus payments and
compensation upon termination.108 The German restrictions on
compensation were among the most restrictive globally.
Commerzbank became Germany's first commercial lender to
turn to the government for capital-a total of C18 billion-transferring
to the federal government a twenty-five percent stake plus one share.
Its rescue was tied to strict restructuring conditions and to the above-
mentioned limits on executive remuneration. Deutsche Bank,
104. See infra Figures 4-6.
105. Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz [FMStG] [Financial Market Stabilization Act], Oct.
17, 2008, BGBL. I at 1982, n.46 (Ger.).
106. Finanzmarktstabilisierungserginzungsgesetz [FMStErgG] [Supplementary Financial
Market Stabilization Act], Apr. 7, 2009, BCBL. I at 725 (Ger.).
107. Financial Market Stabilization Act §§ 1-2 (Ger.). The SoFFin is managed through the
Financial Market Stabilization Act and made C480 billion available to the country's financial
institutions rocked by the global finance crisis. SoFFin was used to guarantee refinancing
instruments (up to thirty-six months) issued by German banks until the end of 2009. German
states were required to contribute financially to the stabilization fund, which also covered
subsidiaries of foreign banks licensed in Germany. Possible measures included guarantees,
recapitalizations, acquisition of risky positions and nationalization. Id.
108. Id. In addition, financial institutions had to review their business policies, avoid risky
transactions, pay no dividends to shareholders and make no share re-purchases, nor capital
reductions, except for reorganization purposes. Strengthening of capital was also required, as
some banks-including Commerzbank, Deutsche Postbank and various Landesbanken-had
tier-one capital ratios below the minimum of eight percent required by Basel. See Klaus J. Hopt
et al., Preventing Bank Insolvencies in the Financial Crisis: The German Financial Market
Stabilisation Acts, 10 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 515, 534-37 (2009) (providing a detailed analysis of
the German bank rescue framework).
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Germany's largest bank, resisted pressure to take government aid.
Nonetheless, the global trend toward crisis-conscious compensation
principles also impacted Deutsche Bank, whose top executives decided
to forgo 2008 bonuses as a signal of difficult times. 09
c. France
The French banking model, which is traditionally heavily
regulated, appears to have endured the crisis better than the
traditionally liberal British model. 110 Banks applying for guarantee
schemes or recapitalization measures had to comply with several
conditions."' First, they had to agree with the government that they
would keep financing the economy (in particular, by making loans
available to small- and medium-sized firms). Second, they had to
comply with certain requirements regarding executive pay, including
those included in the AFEP-MEDEF guidelines. 12 More recently,
executive compensation became one of the hottest topics in the French
political debate. In March 2009 the French government responded to
public outcry against ailing banks with a decree banning stock options
and limiting bonuses for bankers who lay off workers after accepting
109. German labor unions manifested anger in the rising disproportion between manager
and worker wages. See, e.g., Hugh Williamson, Merkel Ally Backs Curbs on Executive Salaries,
FIN. TIMES, May 22, 2008, at 2 (describing the critiques of labor union leaders).
110. The French action plan took the form of a refinancing scheme based on state guarantees
granted in relation to debt securities issued by a refinancing company established for this
purpose, the Soci~t6 frangaise de refinancement de l'6conomie ("SFRE"). This company also
provided loans under certain conditions. Recapitalization measures were taken on the basis of
state guarantees granted for the financing raised by a recapitalization company, the Soci6t6 de
prise de participation de l'Etat ("SPPE"). In addition, specific legislative provisions authorized
the guarantees issued for rescuing Dexia. The French government effected bank
recapitalizations, under the Bank Relief Act, Loi 2008-1061 du 16 octobre 2008 de finances
rectificative pour le financement de l'6conomie [Law 2008-1061 of October 16, 2008 on Budgetary
Provisions for the Financing of the Economy], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA R9PUBLIQUE FRAN(CAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 17, 2008, with the aim of assuring banks' continuous
financing of the real economy. See Martin et al., supra note 87. In December 2008, a first tranche
of C10.5 billion was paid to six banks-BNP Paribas, Soci6t6 G6n~rale, Credit Agricole, Caisse
d'Epargne, Banque F~d~rale des Banques Populaires and Cr~dit Mutuel-which issued deeply
subordinated instruments. In 2009, a second recapitalization tranche was distributed to BNP
Paribas and Soci~t6 G~n6rale in exchange of preferred non-voting shares. See Petrovic & Tutsch,
supra note 87, at 30.
111. Rescue measures in France were essentially founded on Article 6 of the Law on Finance.
Law No. 2008-1061 of Oct. 16, 2008, art. 6 (Fr.).
112. ASS'N FRANCAISE DE ENTREPRISES PRIVIES & MOUVEMENT DES ENTREPRISES DE FRANCE
[AFEP-MEDEF], CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE OF LISTED CORPORATIONS 23-29 (2008),
available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/afep-medefcodedec2008_en.pdf.
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government aid.113  The remuneration requirements were soon
extended from ailing banks to the entire banking sector.
114
d. The Netherlands
The Dutch government made available to the national banking
and insurance industry a series of measures designed to ensure the
stability of the financial system, including a guarantee scheme and
recapitalization measures.115 The guarantee scheme was limited to
banks with a substantial business in the Netherlands. Banks wishing
to use the guarantee had to comply with certain conditions regarding
corporate governance and remuneration, among other things.1 16 Fortis
and ING were two of the largest Dutch banks that applied for the
guarantee scheme. 11 7 The recapitalization scheme, based on a
declaration made by the Dutch Minister of Finance, was subject to
conditions limiting executive pay"18 : bankers needed to relinquish
113. In addition to the release of updated recommendations by the AFEP-MEDEF on
executives pay, a series of professional rules relating to the compensation of financial market
professionals were released. GROUPE DE TRAVAIL DE PLACE, FBF, RtMUNtRATION DES
PROFESSIONNELS DES MARCHtS FINANCIERS (2009), available at http://www.fbf.frWeb
/Internet2ol0/Content.nsffDocumentsBylDWeb/877H3Y/$File/Rapport-remuneration-
operateurs-marches.pdf. Drafted under the aegis of the Haut Comit6 de Place, these rules were a
response to the conditions relating to the access to public financing, as they concerned the
remuneration of both directors and market professionals.
114. Regulation n97-02 relating to internal control was first strengthened on January 14,
2009, requiring credit institutions and investment firms to have in place adequate internal
control frameworks with respect to the remuneration policies (article 5 g). Regulation n97-02
was complemented a second time in November 2009. Arr6t6 du 3 novembre 2009 relatif aux
rbmunbrations des personnels dont les activit6s sont susceptibles d'avoir une incidence sur
'exposition aux risques des 6tablissements de cr6dit et entreprises d'investissement [Decree of
Nov. 3, 2009 regarding remuneration for personnel whose activities might have the effect of
placing credit institutions and investment firms at risk], Journal Officiel de la R6publique
Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Nov. 5, 2009 p. 19,115.
115. Ministerie von Financien [Ministry of Finance], Rules of the 2008 Credit Guarantee
Scheme of the State of the Netherlands, available at http://www.dsta.nlldsresource?type=pdf
&objectid=minfinbeheer:76729&versionid=&subobjectname= (promulgated Oct. 21, 2008,
amended and restated Nov. 27, 2008).
116. Conditions include reporting requirements, maintenance of an agreed solvency ratio,
prohibition of bylaw changes or changes in strategy, the implementation of a "sustainable
remuneration policy" linked to long-term value creation and limiting "rewards for failure" and a
requirement that severance, golden parachutes, or similar termination arrangements be limited
to one year's fixed salary. Martin et al., supra note 87, at 11.
117. Petrovic & Tutsch, supra note 87, at 61.
118. Other conditions relate to guarantees on returns, the financing of operational costs by
the financial enterprises concerned and government representation in the executive bodies.
Among the Dutch banks Fortis, ING, Aegon and SNS Real were subject to recapitalization
measures. Id. at 61-63.
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their bonuses for 2008 and redundancy packages had to be restricted
to one year's fixed annual pay. 119 The Dutch government set further
conditions for bankers' pay within its illiquid assets back-up facility. 120
Accordingly, financial institutions benefiting from the scheme could
not pay bonuses until a new compensation policy was established.
e. Switzerland
The two largest Swiss banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, offer an
example of voluntary changes to remuneration policies by showing a
kind of "race to the top" in this area. The Swiss government took a
nine percent stake in UBS when rescuing it, without imposing any
executive pay restrictions. Nevertheless, UBS was among the first
large European banks to address executive compensation in the wake
of the crisis in 2008 by explicitly seeking to improve its corporate
culture through a new compensation model. 121 The bank did not pay
any bonuses to its executives for that year. Credit Suisse, which did
not require financial assistance from the government, also banned
bonuses, but only to its CEO and chairman. 122 However, despite
emerging from the crisis as one of Europe's winning banks, Credit
Suisse was the first bank to change its remuneration policy soon after,
and in line with, the principles of the 2009 G20 Summit.1 23 Following
119. Press Release, Ministry of Finance, Government Reinforces ING's Core Capital by C 10
Billion (Oct. 19, 2008), available at http://www.minfin.nl/english/News/Newsreleases/2008/10/
GovernmentreinforcesING'scorecapitabyEURl0_billion (Neth.).
120. Particularly in the case of ING Bank. BANK FOR INT'L SE'ITLEMENTS, supra note 89, at
22.
121. The bank considered its own approach as a "pioneering approach to executive
compensation practices." The new compensation model implemented in 2009 included measures
that were subsequently adopted globally by regulators: awards depending on the achievement of
performance targets linked to long-term, risk adjusted value creation; three-year deferral period
for bonuses; bonus-malus (clawback); performance equity plan linked to the performance of the
bank for an initial three-year period; retention by executives of a minimum of seventy-five
percent of their shares for five years; non-binding advisory vote on the principles of executive
compensation. UNITED BANK OF SWITZ. (UBS), COMPENSATION REPORT 2008 at 1, 15-18 (2008),
available at http://www.ubs.com/l/ShowMedialinvestors/annualreporting/2008?contentId =
162881&name=UBSCompensationReport2008_e.pdf.
122. The bank maintained its approach to variable compensation, introducing only a few
changes, such as introducing performance awards linked to the performance of a pool of illiquid
assets and a clawback measure applied to a portion of the cash-based component. CREDIT SUISSE,
Compensation, in ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 171-78 (2008), available at https://www.credit-
suisse.com/investors/enreports/2008_annual-report.jsp.
123. The bank announced a shift in the mix of discretionary bonuses and fixed compensation,
resulting in the payment of an increased proportion of compensation in the form of fixed salary
and some restrictions to variable remuneration. It also devoted particular focus to measures for
limiting and deferring compensation. Press Release, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse Announces its
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Credit Suisse's approach, UBS also announced changes in its 2009 and
2010 pay policies, including payment of bonuses only when the bank
returned to profit. The bank reported a loss for 2009, which held back




This brief overview on European countries shows that curbing
bankers' pay was one of the main conditions for accessing state aid.125
The financial crisis had a sharp impact on the levels and structure of
pay at ailing banks, both in 2008 and in following years. 126 Non-ailing
banks also experienced a similar impact, particularly in countries
where big casualties occurred only at some large banking groups but
stimulated public outrage against all banks.1 27 Relatively healthy
banks in those countries rushed to adopt "virtuous" remuneration
policies similar to those implemented at banks accessing state aid in
the same countries.
In addition to reacting to public outrage and political
pressures, these banks presumably tried to show their commitment to
risk management and control both to investors and regulators by
changing their remuneration policies. 128 Domestic regulations followed
a similar trajectory, initially focusing on bankers' compensation at
rescued institutions and only later extending across national banking
sectors. As a result, the lessons learned from the crisis rapidly
extended to all banks, leading to the adoption of new remuneration
policies, generally in conformity with emerging international
standards.
Compensation Structure for 2009 and 2010 (Oct. 20, 2009), available at https://www.credit-
suisse.com/news/ermedia-release.jsp?ns=41331.
124. UBS introduced a new forward-looking compensation instrument for senior employees,
a Conditional Variable Compensation Plan CCVCP"). The CVCP had a pool of approximately
SFr900 million to vest in three equal tranches in 2010, 2011, and 2012 on the condition that the
group returned to profitability and received no further bailout from the Swiss government. Press
Release, UBS, UBS' Compensation Decisions (Feb. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.ubs.com/l/ShowMedia/index?contentId=161992&name=090210O%20Compensation%2
OnoteEN.pdf.
125. For similar developments in the United States, see Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano,
Reforming Executive Compensation: Simplicity, Transparency and Committing to the Long-Term,
7 EuR. CoMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 273 (2010), manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1506742.
126. See infra Figures 4-6.
127. See infra Table 2.




Measures taken post-crisis by the relevant authorities are best
encompassed in the Principles issued by the FSF-later changed to
the FSB-in April 2009 and in the Standards adopted by the same
body in September 2009.129 In this Subpart, we analyze these
Principles and Standards and offer a critical assessment of the same,
in light of the economic literature.
1. International Principles and Standards
The FSB Principles and Standards address the areas of
governance, remuneration structure, and supervision and disclosure.
Some principles are not new to the extent that they require a balanced
pay structure and long-term approach, alignment of pay with
performance, independence of the pay-setting process, and
compensation disclosure. What is relatively new is the emphasis on
"effective alignment of compensation with prudent risk taking' and
"compensation practices that reduce employees' incentives to take
excessive risk."1 30
a. Remuneration Governance
The Principles require a bank's board of directors to actively
oversee the compensation system's design and operation, requiring
that relevant board members be independent and have expertise in
risk management and compensation. They also require the board of
directors to monitor and review the compensation system to ensure
that it operates as intended. The compensation system should engage
control functions (including human resources, finance, and risk
management) in its decisions, while its practical operation should be
reviewed regularly for compliance with design policies and procedures
by the compliance and internal audit functions. 131
129. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2; STANDARDS, supra note 3. A task force was subsequently set
up by the BCBS to take forward the implementation of remuneration principles, through issuing
an assessment methodology targeted at supervisory authorities. The BCBS accordingly
published a supervisory assessment methodology. BCBS, COMPENSATION PRINCIPLES AND
STANDARDS ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY (2010), available at http://www.bis.orgt
publ/bcbsl66.pdf. The aim of the task force was twofold: to ensure that all supervisory
authorities endorse remuneration policies that are consistent with the Principles, and to agree
on common guidelines on how principles should be implemented in practice. Id. at 1.
130. BCBS, supra note 129, at 11.
131. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, principles 1-2.
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The Standards specify that significant financial institutions
should have a board remuneration committee to oversee the
compensation system's design and operation on behalf of the board of
directors. 132 The remuneration committee should be constituted in a
way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgment
on compensation policies and practices and the incentives created for
managing risk, capital, and liquidity. In addition, the committee
should carefully evaluate practices by which compensation is paid for
potential future revenues whose timing and likelihood remain
uncertain. It should work closely with the firm's risk committee in the
evaluation of the incentives created by the compensation system and
ensure that the firm's compensation policy is in compliance with the
relevant principles and standards.
b. Compensation Structure
As to the alignment with prudent risk taking, the Principles
state that compensation must be adjusted for all types of risk: "Two
employees who generate the same short-run profit but take different
amounts of risk on behalf of their firm should not be treated the same
by the compensation system[.]"133 Risk adjustments should account for
all types of risk, including those which are difficult to measure, such
as liquidity risk, reputation risk, and capital cost.1 34 The Standards
also require "significant financial institutions" 135 to ensure that total
variable compensation does not limit their ability to strengthen their
capital base. Compensation outcomes should be symmetric with risk
132. STANDARDS, supra note 3, standard 1.
133. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, principle 4.
134. For senior executives and employees whose actions have a material impact on the risk
exposure of the firm, "a substantial proportion of compensation should be variable and paid on
the basis of individual, business-unit and firm wide measures that adequately measure
performance." STANDARDS, supra note 3, standard 6.
135. The Principles and Standards both use the term without providing any definition.
However, the term probably includes institutions that are significant from a systemic risk
perspective, for example, those that have a great systemic impact. See generally STAFF OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND & SECRETARIAT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD,
GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND
INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS-BACKGROUND PAPER (2009), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_091107d.pdf; Anthony Saunders et al.,
Enhanced Regulation of Large, Complex Financial Institutions, in RESTORING FINANCIAL
STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM, supra note 19, at 139 (discussing "large, complex
financial institutions (LCFIs)," referring to the universal banks, investment banks, insurance
companies, and hedge funds that dominate the financial industry and are deemed to pose risks
that can become systemic).
2011]
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outcomes: in particular, compensation systems should link the size of
the bonus pool to the overall performance of the firm; employees'
incentive payments should be tied to the contribution of the individual
and business to such performance; and bonuses should diminish or
disappear in the event of poor firm, divisional, or business unit
performance. 136  Furthermore, subdued or negative financial
performance of the firm should generally lead to a considerable
contraction of the firm's total variable compensation, taking into
account both current compensation and reductions in payouts of
amounts previously earned, including through malus or clawback
arrangements. 1
37
Malus and clawback clauses are rather new in compensation
contracts, although adjustments of incentives according to
performance criteria were also made pre-crisis. These clauses are
applicable to both cash incentives and share-based payments. They
allow boards to reduce or reclaim bonuses paid based on results that
are unrepresentative of the company's performance over the long term
or later prove to have been misstated. Where cash incentives are
deferred, unvested portions should be clawed back in the event of
negative business performance. Not all regulations clearly
differentiate between malus and clawback clauses, which are still
relatively rare in practice.
138
Deferment of compensation was traditionally used as a
retention mechanism on the basis that a "bad leaver" will normally
lose unpaid deferrals. Post-crisis reforms give deferral a greater role
by providing that compensation payout schedules should be sensitive
to the time horizon of risks. Therefore, as "profits and losses of
different activities of a financial firm are realized over different
periods of time, variable compensation payments should be deferred
accordingly." 139 Payments should not be finalized over short periods
where risks are realized over long periods. As specified by the relative
standard, a substantial portion of variable compensation (such as, for
example, forty to sixty percent) should be payable under deferral
arrangements over a period of years, and these proportions should
increase significantly with the level of seniority and/or responsibility.
For most senior management staff and the highest-paid employees,
the percentage of deferred variable compensation should be
136. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, principle 5.
137. STANDARDS, supra note 3, standard 5.
138. See infra Part III.B.
139. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, principle 6.
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substantially higher (for example, over sixty percent). 140 The deferral
period "should not be less than three years, provided that [this] period
is correctly aligned with the nature of the business, its risks, and the
activities of the employee in question."141 Moreover, compensation
payable under deferral arrangements should generally vest no faster
than on a pro rata basis.'
42
"Guaranteed bonuses" caused much outrage following banks'
bailouts.' 43 Short-term guarantees are common at banks and are
regarded as relatively harmless and often necessary to hire staff mid-
year. Contracts guaranteeing variable pay for several years, however,
are problematic, as they violate principles of pay-for-performance. The
guarantee insulates variable pay from poor performance, which may
encourage more risk taking than would otherwise be the case. Pre-
crisis rules and standards did not touch upon this issue. 144 Under the
FSB Standards, guaranteed bonuses are not consistent with sound
risk management or the pay-for-performance principle and should not
be a part of prospective compensation plans. Exceptional minimum
bonuses "should only occur in the context of hiring new staff and be
limited to the first year."
145
Severance packages of senior executives fired as a result of
their firms' crises also triggered public outrage for the excessive costs
they imposed on shareholders. 146  Consequently, the future of
140. STANDARDS, supra note 3, standard 6.
141. Id. standard 7.
142. See id. standard 9 ("In the event of negative contributions of the firm and/or the
relevant line of business in any year during the vesting period, any unvested portions are to be
clawed back, subject to the realised performance of the firm and the business line.").
143. The issue was first raised in the United States by Bebchuk in an article published in the
wake of post-crisis reform. See Lucian Bebchuk, Op-Ed., Bonus Guarantees Can Fuel Risky
Moves, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2009 (discussing risks of guaranteed bonuses); see also Ferrarini &
Ungureanu, supra note 96.
144. See Ferrarini et al., supra note 5, at 8-10 (discussing how flawed compensation of
executives contributed to the financial crisis).
145. STANDARDS, supra note 3, standard 11.
146. The issue of severance payments was dealt with by the European Corporate Governance
Forum (ECGF). See EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM, STATEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM ON DIRECTOR REMUNERATION 3 (2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eulinternal-market/company/docs/ecgforumlecgf-remunerationen.pdf
("Severance pay for executive directors should be restricted to two years of annual remuneration
and should not be paid if the termination is for poor performance. The two years restriction
should not be circumvented by long notice periods or otherwise.") The European Commission also
addressed this issue. Commission Recommendation Complementing Recommendations
2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as Regards the Regime for the Remuneration of Directors of
Listed Companies (EC) No. 2009/3177 of 30 Apr. 2009, § 3.5, 2009 O.J. (C 3177) [hereinafter EC
C 3177] (regarding termination payments); Commission Recommendation on Remuneration
2011] 467
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
severance pay has been changed by the new standards. Existing
contractual arrangements related to employment termination should
be reexamined and maintained only if there is a clear basis for
concluding that the relevant payments are aligned with long-term
value creation and prudent risk taking. 147 In perspective, termination
payments should be related to performance achieved over time and
"designed in a way that does not reward failure."
148
The Principles further expand on remuneration structures by
requiring the mix of cash, equity, and other forms of compensation to
be consistent with risk alignment, adjusted according to the
employee's position and role. 149 Moreover, under Standard 8, a
substantial proportion (such as more than fifty percent) of variable
compensation should be awarded in shares or share-linked
instruments, as long as they create incentives aligned with long-term
value creation and the time horizons of risk. In any event, awards in
shares or share-linked instruments should be subject to an
appropriate share-retention policy.
c. Disclosure
Pre-crisis compensation regimes, including those in Europe,
largely focused on disclosure; however, their enforcement did not
always meet the relevant standards. 50 Appropriate disclosure of
remuneration in the firm's annual report should benefit not only
shareholders but also other stakeholders (like creditors and
employees). Disclosure should identify the relevant risk management
and control systems and facilitate the work of supervisors in this area.
The FSB Principles recommend increased transparency by adding new
items of disclosure. In line with the detailed requirements for pay
design, new disclosure requirements include deferral, share-based
incentives, and criteria for risk adjustment.151
Policies in the Financial Services Sector (EC) No. 2009/3159 of 30 Apr. 2009, § 4.5, 2009 O.J. (C
3159) [hereinafter EC C 3159] (addressing payments for early termination of a contract).
147. However this is not seen as overruling existing contracts, rather an invitation from the
supervisors to the parties to review any existing contracts that do not meet new standards.
148. STANDARDS, supra note 3, standard 12.
149. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, principle 7.
150. See Ferrarini et al., Executive Remuneration in Crisis, supra note 20, at 105-06
(discussing low levels of compliance with disclosure requirements in certain European countries).
151. STANDARDS, supra note 3, standard 15.
[Vol. 64:2:431
EXECUTIVE PAYAT EUROPEAN BANKS
d. Supervision
The Principles also require effective supervisory oversight.
52
In the case of a failure by a firm to implement "sound" compensation
policies and practices, "prompt remedial action" should be taken and
"if necessary, appropriate corrective measures to offset any additional
risk that may result from non-compliance or partial compliance [with
the Standards]." 153 The FSB's Commentary on the Principles explains
what these measures might be by stating, with reference to Principle
8: "Particularly when the totality of a firm's compensation practices
are less than sound, supervisors should first exercise suasion on the
affected firm, and in the absence of necessary improvement should
consider escalation to firmer intervention, which may include
increased capital requirements."'154 This approach is consistent with
our call for a softer role for regulation of bankers' pay, in contrast to
the approach implied by scholars who propose that regulators
mandate a given structure of compensation in order to reduce risk
taking by the managers.
155
2. A Critical Appraisal
The FSB Principles incorporate some traditional corporate
governance standards, like those concerning the strategic and
supervisory role of the board, which also apply to the setting and
monitoring of executive pay arrangements. Additionally, the
Principles reflect the post-crisis emphasis on bank risk management
and monitoring by the board of directors, who should determine the
risk appetite of the firm. The Standards reiterate the role of the
remuneration committee in the setting and overseeing of executive
pay, requiring its members to work with the firm's risk committee to
ensure compliance with the relevant requirements. On the whole, the
focus placed by the Principles and Standards on "effective governance
of compensation" deserves approval and reflects a consolidated trend
152. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, principle 8 ("Supervisory review of compensation practices
must be rigorous and sustained, and deficiencies must be addressed promptly with supervisory
action.").
153. STANDARDS, supra note 3, standard 18.
154. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 14.
155. See supra Part 1.3.
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in bank regulation in acknowledging the role of corporate governance
for financial stability purposes.
15 6
a. Reference to Pre-Crisis Best Practices
Compensation structures are considered by the Principles
along lines that reflect, to a large extent, best practices already found
before the crisis. 157 Indeed, the role and limits of equity-based
compensation, as well as the perverse effects of short-term incentives,
have attracted increasing attention in the last twenty years,
particularly after Enron and other accounting scandals that occurred
at the beginning of this century.158 However, the main focus of
discussion has always been on the alignment of managers' incentives
with shareholder wealth maximization. The FSB Principles break new
ground by emphasizing the alignment of compensation with prudent
risk taking, as a result of the recent crisis and the problems of ailing
banks.
Aligning bank managers' interests with the interest of
stakeholders was also pursued to some extent before the crisis
through compensation structures that included long-term incentives
and stock-based compensation. 159 In particular, the requirement that
compensation include a mix of cash, equity, and other forms of
compensation consistent with risk alignment,160 to some degree
reflects pre-crisis best practices, as shown by the remuneration
policies for 2007 of the European large banks that we analyze
below.161
156. See BCBS, ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR BANKING ORGANISATIONS 4
(2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs122.pdf ("Effective corporate governance
practices are essential to achieving and maintaining public trust and confidence in the banking
system, which are critical to the proper functioning of the banking sector and economy as a
whole."); BCBS, ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR BANKING ORGANISATIONS 5-9 (1999),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs56.pdf (discussing mechanisms of corporate governance
that can enhance financial stability); see also BCBS, supra note 80, at 1 ("Given the important
financial intermediation role of banks in an economy, the public and the market have a high
degree of sensitivity to any difficulties potentially arising from any corporate governance
shortcomings in banks.").
157. See Ferrarini et al., supra note 20, at 115-18 (discussing aspects of the Principles that
are based on pre-crisis practices).
158. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 125 (manuscript at 6-7) (discussing the impact of
corporate accounting scandals on equity- and option-based compensation).
159. See infra Part III.B (describing compensation plans at large European banks), and
supra Part I.B (studies describing compensation plans for US banks).
160. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, principle 7.
161. See infra Part III.B.
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b. Prevention of Excessive Risk Taking
As clarified in their Introduction, the Principles should not be
viewed as too prescriptive. 162 They are flexible enough to accommodate
differences between firms and among managers within the same firm.
Even the requirement to treat differently "two employees who
generate the same short-run profit but take different amount of risk
on behalf of their firm" 163 should not be construed too literally. Vhile
compensation structures and amounts should reflect differences in
risk taking, other factors that justify similarities in pay, such as the
need to promote new businesses within the firm or to attract new
talent, could also be considered. 164
The FSB's ultimate goal is to prevent excessive risk taking by
reducing incentives created by remuneration arrangements to do so. It
is implicit in the Principles that a bank's board should pursue a
similar objective when setting and monitoring executive pay. Directors
should check that compensation arrangements do not lead the bank's
managers to excessive risk taking. This could become, under
applicable law, a discrete duty of directors, who will be accountable to
supervisors for compliance with this duty. However, the difficulties in
defining "excessive risk-taking incentives" should not be
underestimated.1 65 Moreover, one should consider that "taking on the
right amount of investment and operating risk is essential to
successfully compete within any industry, and that even creditors
want firms to prudently take on some risk."
1 66
162. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, intro. ("The Principles are intended to reduce incentives
towards excessive risk taking that may arise from the structure of compensation schemes. They
are not intended to prescribe particular designs or levels of individual compensation. One size
does not fit all-financial firms differ in goals, activities and culture, as do jobs within a firm.
However, any compensation system must work in concert with other management tools in
pursuit of prudent risk taking."); see also BCBS, supra note 129, at 22 ('CThe mix of cash, equity
and other forms of compensation [e.g. options] must be consistent with risk alignment. The mix
will vary depending on the employee's position and role [in the bank].").
163. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, principle 4.
164. This may explain why Principle 4 has been slow to be implemented. See also Eric Dash,
Feds Finding Status Quo in Bank Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010, at Bi (noting that "banks tend
to set similar bonus formulas for broad sets of employees and often do not adjust payouts to
account for risks taken by traders or mortgage lending officers").
165. One should first identify what are "appropriate" risk-taking incentives. See John E.
Core & Wayne R. Guay, Is There a Case for Regulating Executive Pay in the Financial Services
Industry? 26 (Jan. 25, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1544104 (explaining that similar incentives "generally stem from
non-linearities in compensation payoffs, whereby the sensitivity of payoffs on the downside is
lower than the sensitivity of payoffs to the upside").
166. Id. at 25.
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As discussed above, the Standards attempt to provide some
guidance with regard to the equity portion of variable
compensation. 167 However, this can also be problematic. In fact, the
incentives deriving from equity-based compensation depend on the
individual executives' portfolios of securities of their respective
banks. 168 In the case of executives holding substantial equity stakes in
their companies, as observed for U.S. banks, stock-based
compensation could "exacerbate" the incentive alignment problems.
69
As a result, the standard in question should be applied, taking into
account the managers' equity holdings in their firms (which are in any
case lower for European banks).170  Interestingly, neither the
Principles nor the Standards attach detailed requirements to the
vesting conditions of stock options and stock grants.' 71 Moreover,
banks are asked to establish a share-retention policy. While the terms
of this policy must be disclosed in the annual report on compensation,
banks are free to set these terms as they see fit.
1 72
c. Deferment as a Key Principle
Deferment of variable compensation is critical to controlling
risk-taking incentives. Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro conducted
empirical research on the link between deferred compensation at
167. STANDARDS, supra note 3, standard 8.
168. See Tung, supra note 72, at 54 (noting the "strong influence that managers' personal
portfolios exert on their risk taking incentives").
169. Id. at 26. On the so called "Fuld problem" (after the name of Lehman's CEO, who held a
large equity stake in Lehman until the time of bankruptcy), Gordon noted that a key systemic
risk problem at Lehman and Bear Stearns was that, when these firms ran into financial
difficulties, their "executives' large equity stakes created an ever-widening gap between their
interests and the interests of nonmanagerial shareholders (as well as the social interest)."
Gordon, supra note 73, at 2. In fact, these executives "would face a much greater proportionate
wealth loss than a diversified shareholder from a dilutive capital raise or sale," whereas "a
diversified shareholder would face a much greater proportionate wealth loss from the systemic
distress that would follow the failure of a systemically important firm." Id.
170. See infra Part III.
171. See FSB, THEMATIC REVIEW ON COMPENSATION: PEER REVIEW REPORT 10-11 (2010)
[hereinafter THEMATIC REVIEW], available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications
/r_100330a.pdf (noting that some jurisdictions ask financial institutions to specify the
proportions of deferment and the vesting period). For instance, some jurisdictions ask "whether
it is intended that the total deferral period should be at least three years, but that part of an
award may vest sooner (as soon as one year) albeit no faster than on a pro-rata basis." Id. at 10
n.13.
172. STANDARDS, supra note 3, standard 15. For a proposal to issue restricted stock for a
relatively long holding period (from two to four years after employment ends), see Bhagat &
Romano, supra note 125, (manuscript at 14).
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banks and credit quality and found that disclosure of deferred
compensation is priced in credit markets through a reduction in CDS
spreads at proxy announcements. 173 They explain this reduction by
arguing that "banks are likely to be more conservative in terms of the
riskiness of their investment choices" as a result of larger investments
in CEO deferred compensation. 174 As we show in our analysis of
remuneration policies at large European banks, deferment is one of
the aspects of variable remuneration more frequently found in 2007
and on the rise after the crisis. 175 This trend is also true for
regulations in force in the various countries examined below, where
deferment is the principle with which legislation, best practices, and
prudential guidelines most often comply.1 76 However, the detailed
requirements for deferment, such as the percentage (forty to sixty) of
variable remuneration that it should cover and the time of deferral
(minimum three years) may appear too rigid, as this is an area which
should be left to bank boards to decide.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN EUROPE
In this Part, we examine how the FSB Principles and
Standards were implemented in Europe. We also review the
remuneration policies of forty large European banks to assess their
compliance with the new standards and compare pre-crisis (2007) and
post-crisis (2009) policies to identify trends and developments. We
conclude by explaining the banks' relative resistance to the adoption of
the new standards.
A. European Reforms
We initially provide an overview of the European pre-crisis
approach to executive compensation at banks; this approach was
mainly grounded on corporate governance and disclosure, even though
the amount of information published was still subject to substantial
differences among Member States. We then consider recent reforms,
which mainly were adopted in light of the new international
Standards, and measure their level of conformity with the new
Standards. We find that the Standards have only been partially
173. BOLTON ETAL., supra note 62, at 27.
174. Id.
175. See infra Table 1 and Figures 1-3.
176. See infra Table 1 and Figures 1-3.
20111
474 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:2:431
implemented through national reforms and identify the level of
conformity with respect to the main Principles and Standards.
1. Pre-Crisis Approach
The European Commission issued two Recommendations
("2004-2005 Recommendations") aimed at improving remuneration
governance and disclosure in 2004 and 2005, respectively. 177 A number
of directives adopted under the Financial Services Action Plan also
form part of the EU's executive compensation package, addressing pay
transparency and insider-dealing issues.178 Research conducted by
Niamh Moloney and one of us on the Member States' laws and
practices prior to the 2004-2005 Recommendations showed a
correlation between incentive pay, its regulation, and corporate
ownership structures. It also found less sophisticated regulation of
executive pay in block-holding systems and a closer focus on the
effectiveness of governance and the pay-setting process in dispersed
ownership countries.
1 79
Following the 2004 and 2005 reforms, we examined the extent
to which regulation of executive pay adopted by listed companies had
changed and assessed the effectiveness of the Commission's voluntary
convergence model.180 We based our analysis on the legal regimes of
177. See Commission Recommendation: Fostering an Appropriate Regime for the
Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies (EC) No. 2004/913 of 14 Dec. 2004, 2004 O.J. (L
385/55) [hereinafter EC C 913] ("Remuneration systems should therefore be subjected to
appropriate governance controls, based on adequate information rights."); Commission
Recommendation on the Role of Non-Executive or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies
and on the Committees of the (Supervisory) Board (EC) No. 2005/162 of 15 Feb. 2005, 2005 O.J.
(L 52/51) [hereinafter EC C 162] (listing, as one of its main objectives, "adapting company law
and corporate governance rules appropriately for different categories of company").
178. The Transparency Directive requires annual disclosure concerning remuneration
policies, total remuneration paid, any contingent or deferred compensation, and benefits in kind
granted to each member of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies. Council
Directive 2004/109, On the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements, 2004 O.J. (L 390/38)
(EC). The Accounts Modernization Directive encourages consistency across Member States in the
level of narrative reporting presented in the annual report. The Market Abuse Directive requires
senior executives to notify their share transactions and prohibits insider dealing. Council
Directive 2003/51, Amending Directives, 2003 O.J. (L 178/16) (EC). The Prospectus Directive
governs disclosure concerning certain share offerings, including employee share plans. Council
Directive 2003/71, On the Prospectus, 2003 O.J. (L 345/64) (EC).
179. See Guido Ferrarini & Niamh Moloney, Executive Remuneration and Corporate
Governance in the EU: Convergence, Divergence, and Reform Perspectives, in REFORMING
COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 267 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004); Guido Ferrarini
et al., Executive Pay: Convergence in Law and Practice Across the EU Corporate Government
Faultline, 4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 243 (2004).
180. Ferrarini et al., supra note 5, at 4; Ferrarini & Ungureanu, supra note 96.
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seventeen Member States and the governance and disclosure practices
of the EU's largest public companies. 181 Our sample of listed
companies included forty-eight banks, which were significant in their
home states and generally had complex organizational structures and
cross-border operations.
Our results did not reveal major differences in disclosure
practices between banking and non-banking firms, consistent with
other studies.18 2 A possible explanation of this result is that pre-crisis
regulation did not differentiate between financial and non-financial
firms. Similar to non-financial firms, most banks complied only with
basic requirements, particularly when room was left for discretion.
18 3
Banks focused primarily on core disclosure requirements, while
information related to important details, such as the link between
performance and variable pay, often was missing from the reports.
Presumably, market pressure for more comprehensive disclosure was
limited.
Nearly all banks had a remuneration committee, which did not
always consist of a majority of independent directors. This trend can
be explained by more general differences in governance structures as
reflected by domestic corporate governance codes.' 8 4 Levels of
disclosure, particularly with respect to remuneration policy, were
different across states and individual firms. Some banks were more
transparent on individual pay rather than on remuneration policy;
others had the opposite approach. With the exception of the United
Kingdom, most European banks lacked comprehensive disclosure.
Elements of their remuneration policies were scattered throughout
their annual reports, making it difficult to properly assess their
remuneration systems. Generally, banks did not provide enough
details regarding the terms of contracts, while their decisionmaking
181. Research was based on public disclosures by members of the FTSEurofirst 300 relating
to 2007; data was provided by FrSE (U.K.) upon direct request.
182. See Adams, supra note 37 (finding that the governance of financial firms is, on average,
not obviously worse than in nonfinancial firms, and even the issue of executive compensation is
not as clear-cut as portrayed by the media).
183. For analysis of the implementation of European Community rules in Member States,
see Ferrarini et al., supra note 5, at 6.
184. For example, German banks do not have separate remuneration committees; the
German Corporate Governance Code, whilst recommending the presence of a special committee
that deals with the remuneration of directors, requires not majority independence of its
membership but rather what the supervisory board "considers an adequate number of
independent members." DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX [DCGK] [GERMAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE], Feb. 26, 2002, ELEKTRONISCHER BUNDESANZEIGER [EBANz.] §
5.4.1, available at http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/index-e.html.
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processes often lacked clarity. 8 5 Moreover, few banks adopted, or at
least disclosed, a forward-looking remuneration policy. Our study
concluded by recommending that the EU regulate disclosure through a
directive.186
2. Post-Crisis Reforms
The European Commission sought to address the problems of
poorly designed executive compensation structures by issuing two
Recommendations in 2009 ("2009 Recommendations"), one on the
remuneration of directors of listed companies and the other on
remuneration policies in the financial services sector.18 7 While the
2004-2005 Recommendations focused on governance structures and
disclosure, 88 the 2009 Recommendations seek to address the design of
pay packages and remuneration policies. 8 9 In the same period, the
Committee on European Banking Supervisors ("CEBS") also
185. Policy disclosure should focus on company policy for the following financial year and
subsequent years (where appropriate) and overview the manner in which policy has been
implemented in previous years. It should include: [1] an explanation of the relative importance of
the variable and non-variable components of directors' remuneration; [2] sufficient information
on the performance criteria on which shares or variable compensation is based; [3] sufficient
information on the linkage between remuneration and performance; [4] the main parameters
and rationale for any annual bonus scheme and non-cash benefits; [5] a description of the main
characteristics of supplementary pension or early retirement schemes; [6] a summary of
company policy on directors' contracts, including the terms and duration of contracts and
provisions for termination payments; and [7] a discussion of the decisionmaking process used for
determining the remuneration policy. See EC C 913, supra note 177, at 3 (presenting "Disclosure
of the Policy on Directors' Remuneration").
186. See Ferrarini & Ungureanu, supra note 96, at 114-16. At the same time, the European
Commission in its 2009 evaluation finds that endorsement of the disclosure provisions of the
2004 Recommendation has increased and that, indeed, there is also a trend among Member
States to regulate these issues in a binding way. The report refers to firms across sectors. Report
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee, and the Committee of the Regions on the Application by
Member States of the EU of the Commission 2009/385/EC Recommendation, COM (2010) 285
final (Feb. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Report on the Application of 2009/385], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/company/docs/directors-remun/com-2010-285-2-en.pdf;
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions on the Application by the Member States
of the EU of the Commission 2009/384/EC Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the
Financial Sector, COM (2010) 286 final (Feb. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Report on the Application of
2009/384], available at http://ec.europa'eu/internal-market/company/docs/directors-remun/com
2010-286-2_en.pdf.
187. EC C 3177, supra note 146; EC C 3159, supra note 146.
188. EC C 913, supra note 177; EC C 162, supra note 177.
189. See Ferrarini et al., supra note 5 (providing a critical analysis of the Commission's
Recommendations); Ferrarini & Ungureanu, supra note 96 (further critical analysis).
EXECUTIVE PAYAT EUROPEAN BANKS
developed principles on remuneration policies applicable across
financial institutions.190 In 2010, the Commission published a report
on Member States' application of the 2009 Recommendations, showing
that it had been neither uniform nor satisfactory. 191
As a result, the Commission decided to issue principles on
remuneration in financial institutions through a directive, including
them in the revised Capital Requirements Directive ("CRD III").192
The CRD III requires banks to have remuneration policies accounting
for risk management and subject to supervisory review.
93
Furthermore, under the CRD III the CEBS issued guidelines on sound
remuneration policies in the financial sector in order to facilitate
implementation. 194
Through the CRD III, the Commission aims to increase EU
compliance with, and even go beyond the FSB Principles and
Standards in Europe, by introducing more rigidity in pay structures.
The criticism that we suggested above-that detailed regulation of
executive pay would undermine the flexibility of pay arrangements,
which is needed in the context of complex financial organizations-
applies as a result.
195
Before the crisis, most EU Member States already had some
form of corporate governance code or legislation covering executive
190. Directive 2010/76/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November
2010 Amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as Regards Capital Requirements for the
Trading Book and for Re-securitisations, and the Supervisory Review of Remuneration Policies,
2010 OJ (L329/3).
191. Report on the Application of 2009/385, supra note 186, at 3-4. In particular, at the time
only sixteen Member States took measures to fully or partially promote the application of the
Recommendation on remuneration policy in the financial sector at the national level. The
remaining eleven countries did not adopt any national measures or were in the process of doing
so. As to the general Recommendation on directors' pay, only ten Member States implemented
more than half of its provisions.
192. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as Regards Capital Requirements for the Trading Book
and for Re-securitisations, and the Supervisory Review of Remuneration Policies, COM (2009) 362
final (July 13, 2009).
193. Article 22 of the revised CRD lays down the cardinal principle whereby banks are
required to ensure that their remuneration policies and practices are consistent with their
organizational structure and promote sound and effective risk management. According to Article
54, competent authorities shall "have the power to impose financial and non-financial penalties
or measures." Id. arts. 22, 54.
194. COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISORS [CEBS], CONSULTATION PAPER No.
42, GUIDELINES ON REMUNERATION POLICIES AND PRACTICES (2010), available at
http://www.eba.europa.euldocuments/Publications/Consultation-papers/2010/CP42/CP42.aspx.
The CEBS has become the European Banking Authority.
195. See supra Part I.B.3.
2011]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
remuneration. Many of the existing corporate governance codes, which
generally apply only to listed companies, were revised in light of the
new global standards. The primary target of recent national reforms,
however, is the financial sector, with respect to which recourse to
legislation is on the rise.
An analysis of the remuneration reforms implemented by
individual Member States during 2010 reveals some common features,
particularly with regard to the core principles, while more significant
variations are found in the detailed requirements. We analyze twenty-
five texts issued by the European Commission and by regulatory
authorities from eight jurisdictions selected for having adopted
specific measures to implement the international standards, including
laws, corporate governance codes, and guidelines by financial
supervisors. Annex 1 provides a list of these regulations, which are
classified as either binding or nonbinding.196 We benchmark these
texts against twenty-five international principles and standards
grouped in three areas: remuneration governance, pay structure, and
disclosure. Annex 2 presents the criteria considered in our
assessment. 197 Annex 3 includes a matrix giving a clear picture of the
mix of regulations adopted in each of the major European markets
post-crisis. 198 Figure 1 provides an overview of the implementation of
the international principles and standards in the eight countries and
twenty-five texts examined. 199 The highest level of implementation
has been achieved in the area of remuneration governance, 200 while
principles related to remuneration structure and its disclosure met
lower adoption. Nevertheless, we note a trend toward increased
requirements for disclosure of remuneration compared to our pre-
196. Recommendations issued by the European Commission, such as, for example, the
Commission Recommendations cited supra note 146, are also considered among the
benchmarked positions. The other eight benchmarked jurisdictions are: the United Kingdom,
Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, France, Switzerland, Belgium, and Sweden.
197. In grouping the criteria, we closely followed the categorization employed by the BCBS in
its Methodology Assessment, which, more specifically, defines the supervisory review framework
with regard to the three issues addressed by the FSB Principles: (i) effective governance of
compensation, (ii) effective alignment of compensation with prudent risk-taking, and (iii)
effective supervisory oversight and engagement by stakeholders. BCBS, supra note 129, at 1. For
the specific twenty-five criteria we closely followed the global measures adopted by the FSB
Principles and Standards.
198. The matrix provides a breakdown of the type of rules (for example, law, best practices,
and guidelines issued by the financial supervisor) and states the scope for each of these rules.
199. The graph depicts the frequency of each criterion in the analyzed regulatory texts.
200. As per Annex 2, the governance area includes criteria relative to the existence of a
remuneration committee, its independence, the responsibility of the board in the pay process,
and the independence of risk control functions.
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crisis assessment. As to pay structure, the highest level of
implementation occurred with respect to deferral, the balance between
fixed and variable pay, and the requirement for financial and non-
financial performance criteria; limits on guaranteed bonuses and
criteria regarding share-linked instruments have not met much
support among the jurisdictions. 20 1 Disclosure measures regarding pay
design characteristics and pay process are better implemented.
201. The European Commission and FSB evaluation reports similarly point out better levels
of adoption of principles related to remuneration governance. Concerning the remuneration
structure, they also reveal some progress in the area of adjusting pay structures with risk
management through deferral mechanisms, recognizing however that further work is needed to
raise standards of risk adjustment of pay structures across the banking industry. See, e.g.,
Report on the Application of 2009/385, supra note 186, at 8 (noting the need for further reform).
The FSB, reporting on several countries also outside the EU, emphasizes the more pronounced
differences in implementing its principles, for example by way of enforcing them through legally
binding requirements-in some countries-whilst in others implementation is by way of
supervisory guidance. THEMATIC REVIEW, supra note 171, at 6.
2011] 479
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In order to specifically assess the principles and standards
adopted by national supervisory authorities, in a second stage of our
analysis we do not consider the corporate governance codes and laws,
which apply to all listed companies, including non-financial firms. We
examine, among the twenty-five texts analyzed, the nine regulations
issued by financial supervisors, illustrating the results in Figure 2. In
line with our first assessment, remuneration governance principles
achieved the highest level of implementation, whereas disclosure had
the lowest level. As to governance, the standards most complied with
are those concerning the role of the risk management and compliance
functions in the remuneration system. Regarding pay structure, the
principle most often complied with is deferment of variable pay. As to
disclosure, two requirements come up most frequently in regulations:
those concerning the design characteristics and the criteria for pay
measurement and risk adjustment.
20 2
202. In line with our observations, both the FSB and the Commission evaluation reports
reveal an improvement in requiring minimum standards for disclosure, however noting a lower
endorsement of principles concerning detailed disclosure, particularly with respect to incentive
structures. See Report on the Application of 2009/385, supra note 186, at 8 ("[E]ndorsement of
the disclosure and shareholder vote provisions of the 2004 Recommendation has increased
significantly in recent years."); THEMATIC REVIEW, supra note 171, at 10 (noting that "[sleveral




Figure 2. Implementation of the International Principles
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B. The Remuneration Policies of Large European Banks
In this Subpart, we compare large European banks'
remuneration policies as established before the crisis (2007) with the
policies adopted following the post-crisis reforms (2009). We take our
sample from two indexes, FTSEurofirst300 and Dow Jones Stoxx 600
Banks. 20 3 We overmatch the two indexes and select a sample of forty
banks, which are representative of the major listed EU banks in terms
of market capitalization. The list is provided in Annex 4.
We consider twenty-three banks in our sample as "ailing," on
the basis of the fact that they received some form of government
support during the crisis, and the remaining seventeen banks as "non-
ailing." We analyze the remuneration policies applied by these banks
in 2007, which reflect their approach before the crisis, and the
standards adopted or carried over after the crisis, in 2009. We mainly
rely on the FSB Principles as benchmarks for our assessment, as in
major part they have been followed by the European Commission's
regulatory framework. Some of the principles had already been stated
before the crisis, primarily in corporate governance codes, although in
a generic manner.
20 4
Annex 5 identifies the criteria used in our analysis.
Considering that annual reports on compensation should include,
under the applicable rules, comprehensive information on the relevant
decisionmaking process and the main design characteristics, we
assume that banks behaved de facto as described in their
remuneration policy. If an item is not reported, we consider it to be
non-applicable.
More than half of all banks (62.5 percent) reviewed their
remuneration policies in light of the new international Principles.
Some banks underwent major changes to their pay structure, while
others experienced only minor changes, either to the pay structure or
to their decisionmaking process. Most banks made amendments in
203. We have used the FTSEurofirst 300 in a previous study, when analyzing banks'
approach to remuneration governance and disclosure before the crisis. Ferrarini et al., supra
note 5, at 57.
204. See Ferrarini et al., supra note 5, at 69 (on the policy for LTIPs in various corporate
governance codes); Index of Codes, EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE,




2009 and implemented them either in the same year or in 2010.205
However, a few banks pledged to adopt new remuneration policies in
2010. As a result, 2009 still appears to be a year of transition.
20 6
As to remuneration governance, we observe that most
amendments regard the risk function (or, where existent, the risk
committee, which must be involved in the decisionmaking process) as
recommended by the FSB. Few banks enhanced the responsibility of
the boards in their remuneration system. In particular, German banks
followed a unique approach, assigning full responsibility for executive
remuneration to the supervisory board, as now required by the law on
adequate remuneration. 207
We analyze pay alignment with long-term performance by
checking the presence of Long-Term Incentive Plans ("LTIPs") in
remuneration policies. Pre-crisis the majority of banks in our sample
(87.5 percent) had a mix of base salary, annual bonuses, and long-term
equity-based incentives. 208 The situation has not changed significantly
post-crisis. In fact, we find a minor decrease in long-term incentives,
which may be explained by the fact that some banks did not launch
new share plans or grant shares or options to their senior
management immediately after the financial turmoil.
Deferment of variable pay also reflects a long-term perspective.
Interestingly, forty percent of banks already had a deferment
mechanism in 2007.209 However, banks do not generally indicate the
proportion of deferred compensation and the relevant periods,
occluding a proper evaluation of the banks' deferral policies. This
behavior has not changed significantly in 2009: although a greater
number of banks (sixty-five percent) disclose a deferment
mechanism, 210 identifying either the proportion or the timing of the
deferral is still uncommon. Only thirty-eight percent of banks with a
deferment mechanism in place specify a minimum forty percent
205. Ailing banks such as Lloyds, RBS, Allied Irish Banks, ING, KBC Group applied more
significant changes to their remuneration policies than their French ailing peers, Sociot6
Gn6rale and BNP Paribas, and Spanish non-ailing peers, such as BBVA and Banco Santander.
206. Also the European Commission acknowledges that, as most regulatory changes are still
ongoing, the new principles' application in practice is still difficult to assess. Report on the
Application of 2009/384, supra note 186, at 10.
207. Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergiitung [GzAdV] [Act on the
Appropriateness of Management Board Remuneration], Aug. 5, 2009, BGB1. I §§ 2509-11.
208. Among the banks which did not include a LTIP in their pay structure were Deutsche
Postbank, UBI Banca, DnB NOR, Banco Popolar, and Handelsbanken.
209. Especially the U.K., Irish, and Swiss banks, which were in fact among the worst
performers during the crisis.
210. Among the new adopters are some French, Italian, and Belgian banks.
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proportion for the deferral component, 211 while approximately seventy
percent of banks set a three-year minimum deferral period.
Most banks already had indicated the vesting period for LTIPs
in 2007, with their number increasing in 2009 (from eighty-nine
percent to ninety-five percent). However, vesting periods are not
always three years or more, as recommended by the new Standards.
Only forty-five percent of the banks with an LTIP in place had such a
time frame before the crisis.212 After the crisis, the number of banks
adopting a minimum three-year vesting period amounts to sixty
percent. The new Standards also require a share-retention policy for
equity-linked pay. This policy was uncommon both before the crisis
(only eleven percent of banks had a similar policy in place) and after
(about thirty percent of banks with LTIPs adopted it).213
A small number of banks had some form of bonus-malus in
place before the crisis, while clawback clauses were not present.
Immediately after the crisis, the situation is not much different. In
most cases, only one of these mechanisms is in place or information
given in the remuneration report does not allow differentiation. 214 In
most cases these mechanisms do not apply to all elements of variable
pay, such as the annual cash bonus and the deferred pay component.
Termination payments are another major issue in the reform
discussion. The FSB requires these to be aligned with long-term value
and prudent risk taking. However, this Standard is not yet widely
followed. Most firms disclosing a termination contract in their
remuneration reports indicate the relevant amount in one to two years
of annual pay, without conditioning its payment-to-performance
criteria.
As to the performance sensitivity of senior management pay,
the new Standards recommend the use of performance measures that
account for current and future risks, such as economic profit rather
than net profit or revenues. Regulators strongly support non-financial
211. For example Lloyds, HSBC, UBS, and Credit Suisse adopted a minimum forty percent
proportion, while Barclays and Bank of Ireland maintained a twenty-five percent for the deferral
element.
212. In particular all U.K, Swiss, and Irish banks from our sample set minimum vesting
periods of three years; Greek and Portuguese banks generally set a two-year minimum vesting
period.
213. Lloyds, HSBC, and BNP Paribas were among the banks adopting a share retention
policy both prior and following the crisis. Mediobanca and Unicredit were among the banks
introducing a share retention policy as part of their post-crisis remuneration policies.
214. UBS and HSBC were among the few banks having a malus/clawback arrangement in
place before and after the crisis. Commerzbank and BNP Paribas adopted partial malus
mechanisms.
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criteria. Most banks have used net profit and revenue as measures of
their executives' performance; only twenty percent, however,
accounted for risks in their performance criteria before the crisis. 215 In
addition, most banks considered non-financial measures before the
crisis (sixty-five percent), and that approach has been reinforced post-
crisis (seventy-five percent).
Table 1 and Figure 3 illustrate the level of banks' compliance
with the new standards regarding pay structure, in 2007 and 2009.
Table 1. Mechanisms for Pay Structure
2007 2009 2007 2009
Pay Structure (No. of Banks) (No. of Banks) (%) (%)
Fixed + annual bonus
+ LTIP 35 33 87.50% 82.50%
Deferment 16 26 40.00% 65.00%
% of bonus set 6 10 37.50% 38.46%
If set % > 40% 4 10 25.00% 38.46%
Deferral period 6 20 37.50% 76.92%
No. of years >=3 4 18 25.00% 69.23%
Vesting period set 18 21 51.43% 63.64%
Vesting no. of years
>=3 16 20 45.71% 60.61%
Share-retention policy 4 10 11.40% 30.30%
Malus/Clawback 3 17 7.50% 42.50%
No severance pay
contract 3 4 7.50% 10.00%
If set, linked to
performance 2 2 5.41% 5.56%
215. In particular, all U.K banks already used economic profit as a performance measure for
their incentives before the crisis.
486
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A comparison between ailing and non-ailing banks in Table 2
shows no significant differences in approach between the two
categories. In fact, surprisingly, LTIPs are slightly more diffuse in
ailing than in non-ailing banks, both prior to and after the crisis.
216
Ailing banks also were more likely to adopt minimum vesting
periods.2 17 This pattern would confirm that in Europe the role of long-
term equity incentives is similar to that in the United States pre-
crisis.2
18
Table 2. Ailing vs. Non-ailing Banks' Approach
Non-ailing (17 banks) 2007 2009 2007 2009
Remuneration policy: year change 11 64.71%
LTIP (share-linked) 12 12 70.59% 70.59%
Deferment Yes/No 8 11 47.06% 64.71%
Share vesting period (min) 5 6 29.41% 35.29%
Malus/Clawback 1 6 5.88% 35.29%
Ailing (23 banks) 2007 2009 2007 2009
Remuneration policy: year change 15 65.22%
LTIP (share-linked) 23 21 100.00% 91.30%
Deferment Yes/No 8 15 34.78% 65.22%
Share vesting period (min) 11 13 47.83% 56.52%
Malus/Clawback 2 11 8.70% 47.83%
An analysis of cash remuneration earned by executives
between 2007 and 2009 shows that nearly all banks responded to the
public criticism about excessive remuneration in the financial sector
by reducing bonuses both in the crisis year (2008) and in the following
year. Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the cash remuneration (fixed and
bonus) earned by CEOs and executives of the banks in our sample
during the three-year period.
216. Among ailing banks that gave up on LTIP as part of their post-crisis remuneration
structure, as opposed to their policy before the crisis, are Banco Comercial and Danske Bank.
217. For example, while Commerzbank adopted a minimum five-year vesting period, its
main peer Deutsche Bank did not adopt similar criteria. Similarly, U.K. banks such as Lloyds
and RBS were among the adopters of a minimum vesting period, while Barclays was not.
218. See supra Part I.B.1 (finding "no evidence that banks with a better alignment of CEOs'
interests with those of their shareholders had higher returns during the crisis").
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Figures are in Euros.
Total Remuneration ("TR") = fixed pay + annual cash bonus (+ perks +
pension as disclosed by each bank).









Figures are in Euros.
TR = fixed pay + annual cash bonus (+ perks + pension as disclosed by each
bank).
RBS's CEO was appointed during the financial year; his fixed pay reflects the
period when he was in charge.
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Figure 6. CEO Cash Compensation in 2009
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Nearly all banks adopted long-term equity plans for their
senior management. Due to inconsistencies and gaps in the disclosure
of equity incentive plans, we did not conduct a comparative analysis of
the total value of their LTIPs. In order to estimate the value of the
equity-linked component of CEOs' pay packages before the crisis, we
calculated the value of the shares they owned in 2007.
The equity-based compensation as a proportion of total pay is
significant at both U.S. and European banks; however, the value
amount varies considerably. Although lack of disclosure in Europe
impedes proper benchmarking, a rough analysis supports this
statement. The study by Fahlenbrach and Stulz finds that in 2006
bank CEOs had substantial wealth invested in their banks. In their
sample of twenty-one top U.S. banks, the median CEO equity
compensation is valued at more than $100 million.219 Some individual
equity positions are valued as high as $1.062 billion (CEO of Bear
Stearns) and $911.5 million (CEO of Lehman Brothers). Equity values
in Europe stay at much lower levels than in the United States.220 Our
research shows that the median interest in shares owned by the CEOs
of the top fourteen European banks is valued at C14 million. Figure 7
shows the value of CEOs' interest in their firms' shares at end of the
2007 fiscal year.
219. Authors define the total dollar value of equity of a CEO at the end of fiscal year 2006 as
the sum of unrestricted and restricted shares held multiplied by the end-of-year share price plus
the Black-Scholes value of exercisable and unexercisable stock options plus the fair value of
unearned equity incentive plans. Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 4, at 12.
220. See Conyon et al., supra note 7, at 76, which compares 2008 CEO pay in the USA and
10 European countries after controlling for sales and industry; the authors classify the relevant
industry as 'financial industry', without delimiting banks.
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The data analyzed in this Part show that European law and
practice are converging toward the FSB Principles and Standards.
However, convergence is mainly focused on a subset of standards,
while for others some resistance to implementation remains, both
from regulators and banks in our sample. Not surprisingly, adherence
to the new Standards is more commonly found for corporate
governance than for remuneration structures. Regulating board
organization and processes is less intrusive than intervening directly
on remuneration arrangements. Also, disclosure standards such as
information on the decisionmaking process, compensation design
characteristics, and individual compensation amounts, still meet
resistance to implementation, suggesting-as already argued in our
previous studies 221-that this is an area for EU harmonization. In fact,
lack of sufficient disclosure in most European countries forecloses
proper understanding of executive compensation practices and
monitoring of the same by the markets. However, financial regulators
recently improved disclosure of pay practices under the influence of
the FSB Principles.
222
In general, we find that convergence is stronger at the
regulatory level, particularly with respect to executive pay structures,
than in practice. This finding is likely due to the fact that banks still
need to fully implement national reforms in their remuneration
policies. Moreover, weak disclosure may conceal compliance with some
standards, making convergence appear lower. It is also foreseeable
that the level of banks' compliance with the international Standards
will rise once national reforms giving effect to them are fully
implemented. Moreover, enforcement of the new Standards at a
national level will depend on the intensity of supervisory action in this
area. Supervisors will be in a position to influence both corporate
governance and remuneration practices, leading them in the direction
of convergence, which is detached from detailed regulatory
prescriptions.
We also find that compliance is higher with respect to some
core principles, such as deferment of variable pay, and lower with
respect to more detailed standards, such as those concerning the
proportion of deferred pay of the total variable remuneration or the
deferral period. This trend reflects a more general resistance to
221. Ferrarini et al., supra note 5; Ferrarini & Ungureanu, supra note 96.
222. See supra Part II.B.1.
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detailed regulation of pay structures, which may be too rigid and
hinder the efficient tailoring of compensation contracts. In addition,
new mechanisms, such as bonus-malus and clawback arrangements,
still find some resistance to implementation in practice. This
resistance is likely due both to their novelty and to the fact that they
increase the uncertainty of variable pay for executives, who could be
asked to pay back what they already received in addition to forfeiting
future payments. 2
23
On the whole, we do not think that the limits to convergence
found in our analysis should be negatively assessed. As explained
throughout the Article, the case for regulating bankers' pay is, to some
extent, dubious and further research and experimentation should be
done on the optimal pay structures at financial institutions. Therefore,
regulation of bankers' pay should be restricted in scope and flexible
enough to allow for diversity and innovation. In essence, only core
principles should be found in regulation, focusing on the prudential
implications of executive pay and the need to avoid incentives for
excessive risk taking. Given that each institution should define, when
setting strategy at the board level, its overall level of risk tolerance,
remuneration policies should no doubt be consistent with similar
determinations, as further specified through the firm's risk
management policies. However, banking supervisors should avoid
micromanaging executive compensation by interfering with the details
of pay structures beyond what is strictly required by the overarching
goal of preventing excessive risk taking. Moreover, convergence should
not be sought at any cost, including that of rigidity. While the benefits
of convergence cannot be ignored, given that international
coordination is required for bankers' pay to be regulated in
competitive global markets, requirements for pay structures that are
too specific would possibly increase the total amounts of
compensation, reflecting the limited adaptability of pay arrangements
to individual circumstances. Moreover, rigid requirements could make
it more difficult for banks to compete with other firms in the market
for managers.
223. In the case of a mere deferment of variable pay, what was already paid to the manager
cannot be asked back by the company. The manager could only forfeit future payments if the
performance targets are not met. In the case of either a bonus-malus or a clawback arrangement,
on the contrary, the manager could lose also what was already paid to him if the performance




In this Article, we argue that there is no strong support for
regulating bankers' compensation design at banks. According to some
recent empirical studies, corporate governance and compensation
structures at banks that failed in the recent crisis were not necessarily
flawed. Other studies analyzing the optimal remuneration structures
for financial institutions suggest that regulation should promote
incentives enhancing enterprise value rather than shareholder value.
However, prudential bank regulation is undergoing reforms in areas
like capital adequacy and prompt corrective action, which tackle
excessive risk taking by financial institutions directly. Regulation of
executives' incentives, in contrast, would only have an indirect impact
on these institutions' safety and soundness. Therefore, while the case
for regulating bankers' compensation cannot be totally rejected, we
suggest that any reform in this area should carefully consider the
overall regulatory framework and the different tools that can be
deployed to control risk taking. In addition, regulation of bankers' pay
should mainly be principles-based and flexible enough to allow for
experimentation and innovation in pay structures.
This Article also notes that political support for regulating
bankers' pay has been significant as a result of the recent crisis and
pressures to adopt reforms in this area are difficult to resist. Indeed,
public opinion and mass media regard flawed compensation structures
and short-term incentives as main determinants of the crisis, leading
to claims for legal reforms as well as for moderation in pay measures.
As a result, post-crisis reforms focus on requiring long-term incentives
(although this was already the practice for most financial institutions
before the crisis, including those that later failed). The FSB Principles
follow a similar pattern without meeting much resistance from the
main financial circles, precisely because they reflect pre-crisis best
practices. However, the Principles also widen the powers of
supervisors by explicitly acknowledging that executive pay is an area
for prudential regulation.
The Principles represent a political compromise between the
various interest groups by incorporating traditional criteria and
adapting the same to new circumstances. We suggest that a similar
degree of flexibility should be kept when implementing the Principles
in national jurisdictions. Domestic regulations of bankers' pay should
be general in character and delegate to boards of directors and
financial supervisors the respective tasks of defining the incentive
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structures applicable to individual institutions and prudentially
monitoring the same.
Our analysis of domestic regulations in some European states
finds a certain degree of flexibility in the implementation of the
Principles. However, only eight jurisdictions were considered, as the
implementation process is still ongoing. Our analysis of remuneration
policies at large European banks also shows that these are converging
toward the international Principles, while varying in the
implementation of the Standards. However, the CRD III may push
remuneration practices more in the direction of uniformity, making
the relevant structures more rigid and converting the international
Standards into national regulatory prescriptions. These prescriptions
will likely be enforced by banking supervisors in line with the CEBS
guidelines, which seem to leave little room for flexibility and will
therefore further enhance the uniformity of bankers' compensation
practices across Europe. It is unclear whether a similar outcome was
contemplated by the G20 governments when the FSB Principles were
adopted. It also remains to be seen whether a similar path will be
followed globally or national variations will emerge in the
implementation of the international Principles. If countries move more
along the lines advocated in this Article, the role of corporate
governance in the prudential regulation of banks will clearly be
enhanced.
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Annex 1. List of Regulations
Global
Financial Stability Forum: FSF Principles for sound compensation practices (2009)
Financial Stability Board: Principles for sound compensation practices. Implementation
standards (2009)
European Commission
1. Commission Recommendation complementing Recommendations 20041913/EC and
2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies
(C(2009) 3177)
2. Commission Recommendation on remuneration policies in the financial services sector
(C(2009) 3159)
3. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading
book and for re-securitizations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies (2009)
United Kingdom
4. Code of Corporate Governance (2010)
5. Financial Services Authority: Policy Statement 09/15, Reforming Remuneration Practices
in Financial Services: Feedback on CP09/10 and Final Rules (2009)
6. Walker Review: A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial
Industry Entities (2009)
Germany
7. Code of Corporate Governance (2009)
8. Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Remuneration (Gesetz zur
Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergiitung, "VorstAG') (2009)
9. BaFin Circular 22/2009 (BA) -Supervisory Requirements for Institutions' Remuneration
Systems (2009)
Netherlands
10. Corporate Governance Code (2009)
11. Association of Dutch Banks: Banking Code (2009)
Italy
12. Code of Corporate Governance, Art. 7 Remuneration of Executive Directors (2010)
13. Bank of Italy: Supervisory provisions concerning banks' organization and corporate
governance (2008)
14. Bank of Italy: Remuneration and Incentivation Systems (Sistemi di Remunerazione e
Incentivazione) (2009)
France
15. AFEP/MEDEF: Corporate Governance Code (2009)
16. Ministerial Decree: 'Arrt du 3 novembre 2009 relatif aux r~mun6rations des personnels
dont les activitds sont susceptibles d'avoir une incidence sur l'exposition aux risques des
6tablissements de crddit et entreprises d'investissement' (2009)
17. French Banking Federation: 'Normes professionnelles concernant la gouvernance et les
rdmundrations variables des professionnels des marchds financiers' (2009)
Switzerland
18. Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance (2008)
19. The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA): Compensation Regulations
Issued for Swiss Banks and Insurance Companies (2009)
Belgium
20. The Belgian Code on Corporate Governance (2009)
21. The Belgian Banking Finance and Insurance Commission (CBFA): Recommendation on
sound remuneration policies in financial institutions (2009)
22. Belgian Law on Corporate Governance (2010)
23. Febelfin Code of Conduct as for remuneration of certain categories of financial staff
members (2010)
Sweden
24. Code of Corporate Governance (2009)
25. Finansinspektionen (Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority) binding regulations and
guidelines on remuneration policies (2010)
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Annex 2. Criteria-Regulations
GOVERNANCE REGULATORY PROVISIONS
Remuneration Committee Existence of Remuneration Committee
Remuneration Committee independence Independence of the Remuneration Committee:
composition and judgment
Supervisory Board responsibility Enhanced responsibility of the Supervisory
Board in the remuneration system
Involvement of risk control/compliance Input from the risk committee/risk and
functions compliance function in the remuneration
process
Independence of risk control functions Independence of staff involved in the
remuneration process, including independent
compensation
PAY STRUCTURE AND RISK ALIGNMENT
Financial and non-financial measures Adoption of both financial and non-financial
criteria for measuring performance
Link to individual, unit, group Linking individual pay to individual, unit and
performance group performance
Malus/Clawback Adoption of malus/clawback mechanisms in case
of subdued or negative performance
Guaranteed bonuses banned Banning guaranteed bonuses; exceptional for
new hiring, limited to one year
Balance cash, equity, other forms Pay structure ensuring balance between cash,
equity and other forms of payment
Deferral mechanism Annual incentives to be deferred over a certain
period of time
Deferral proportion >40% Proportion of deferred component to be set at
minimum 40%
Deferral period >3 years Deferral period set at minimum 3 years
Malus/Clawback of deferred component Malus/clawback mechanisms applied to the
deferred component in case of subdued or
negative performance
Share-linked instruments >50% Minimum 50% of the variable compensation to
be awarded in shares
Share retention policy Adoption of a share retention policy
Termination payments linked to Termination payments subject to performance
performance achievement, avoiding rewards for failure
No personal hedging Employees to commit not to use personal
hedging strategies
DISCLOSURE
Decisionmaking process Disclosure of the decisionmaking process
Design characteristics Disclosure of the main design characteristics
Criteria for performance measurement and Disclosure of criteria for performance
risk adjustment measurement and risk adjustment
Parameters for cash bonuses Disclosure of the parameters for cash bonuses
Deferral policy Disclosure of the deferral policy
Vesting criteria Disclosure of the vesting criteria
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Annex 4. List of Banks
Country Code Stock Exchange Bank
GB LSE HSBC
ES SIBE BCO SANTANDER
FR EURONEXT BNP PARIBAS





CH SIX CREDIT SUISSE GRP
FR EURONEXT GRP SOCIETE GENERALE
DE XETRA DEUTSCHE BANK
IT MIL INTESA SANPAOLO
GB LSE STANDARD CHARTERED
SE OMX NORDEA BANK
GR ATHEX NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE
FR EURONEXT CREDIT AGRICOLE
GB LSE LLOYDS BANKING GRP
SE OMX SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN
GB LSE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND
DK OMX DANSKE BANK
SE OMX SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BK
IT MIL UBI BCA
AT XETRA ERSTE GROUP BANK
NO OSE DNB NOR
DE XETRA COMMERZBANK
SE OMX SWEDBANK
BE EURONEXT KBC GRP
GR ATHEX ALPHA BANK
ES SIBE BCO POPULAR ESPANOL
BE EURONEXT DEXIA
IT MIL MEDIOBANCA
ES SIBE BCO SABADELL
IT MIL BCO POPOLARE
GR ATHEX PIRAEUS BANK
GR ATHEX EFG EUROBANK ERGASIAS
FR EURONEXT NATIXIS
PT EURONEXT BCO ESPIRITO SANTO
IE XETRA BANK OF IRELAND
IE XETRA ALLIED IRISH BANKS
AT XETRA RAIFFEISEN INTERNATIONAL
BANK
DE XETRA DEUTSCHE POSTBANK
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Annex 5. Criteria-Banks
1. Review of the remuneration Policy
Any changes in the remuneration policies refer to the year 2009 or are formulated for
implementation in 2010. We consider changes in remuneration policies if banks have
applied relevant amendments to their principles for 200912010, in accordance with new
reforms.
2. Changes in remuneration governance
We follow the FSB Principles regarding the governance of remuneration.
3. Pay structure
A. Pay: Fixed + Variable + LTIP
Analysis of banks' pay package, including base pay, annual bonus and long term
incentives
B. Deferment Y/N
Whether banks had a deferment mechanism
C. % of bonus set Y/N
Whether banks with a deferment mechanism in place set a proportion for the
deferred component
D. If set %>= 40%
Whether banks with a deferment mechanism in place set a proportion for the
deferred component of 40% or above
E. Deferral period Y/N
Whether banks with a deferment mechanism in place set a deferral period
F. No. of years >= 3
Whether banks with a deferment mechanism in place set a deferral period of 3
years or above
G. Setting of vesting period for the LTIP
Whether banks with a LTIP have set a vesting period for exercising the shares
H. Vesting period >= 3 years
If set, whether this period is minimum 3 years
I. Share retention policy
Whether banks that have a LTIP in place have a share retention policy in place
J. Malus/Clawback
We consider this criterion to be complied with if either of the two mechanisms is
included in the remuneration policy.
K. No severance payment contract: Y/N
Whether banks specified that they did not have termination payment contracts in
place for directors.
L. If set, whether linked to performance: Y/N
Whether severance pay is awarded based on performance.
